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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] After two long years collecting hundreds of gigabytes of e-mail, 
data base reports, and social media posts from countries in Europe, Asia, 
and South America, such as France, South Korea, Argentina, Canada, 
Australia, and El Salvador, the day of trial has arrived.  The trial team has 
obtained the data at great cost, in dollars as well as person-hours, but is 
finally ready for trial.  First-chair counsel, second-chair counsel, and four 
paralegals file into the courtroom, not with bankers boxes full of 
documents as in earlier times, but with laptops, tablet computers, and a 
data projector.  Following opening statements, the first witness takes the 
stand.  After a few questions about the existence of e-mails written by 
executives of the defendant multinational corporation, a paralegal moves 
to the projector, as she rehearsed many times, to flip on the switch that 
will project the e-mails for the jury.  She hears, “Objection!” followed 
immediately by, “Sustained.”  Counsel asks for a sidebar.  Instead, the 
judge asks the court officer to take the jury out.  She then notes that these 
e-mails, the production of which she had ruled upon previously, were 
created outside the U.S.  Who will testify to their authenticity?  What was 
the chain of custody—were they altered in some fashion in the office or 
between the client’s servers and counsel’s laptop?   How, exactly, do the 
e-mails fit into an exception to the hearsay rule?  Business records?  What 
is the “business” of this foreign facility that requires the use of e-mail on a 
regular basis?  Counsel asks for a continuance to respond to those 
questions.  “Denied!” the judge says. 
 
[2] The above cautionary tale describes the next logical step to the 
cross-border discovery wars that have raged on over the last several 
years.1  Studies have shown that over ninety percent of all business 
                                                            
1 See generally SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. SIX, FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
OF CROSS-BORDER DISCOVERY CONFLICTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THE 
COMPETING CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY AND DISCOVERY 14-16 
(2008) [hereinafter SEDONA FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.thesedona 
conference.org/dltForm?did=WG6_Cross_Border.  
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correspondence exists in digital form.2  The pace of global commerce is 
accelerating, and thus, increasing amounts of documentary evidence 
needed for U.S. litigation, arbitration, and regulatory proceedings comes 
from outside the United States.3  While the law continues to evolve with 
regard to discovery and disclosure of protected data across borders, it is in 
a state of relative infancy with regard to admissibility of that information.  
Furthermore, it would be a disappointing and expensive endeavor indeed 
if hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees were spent to gather and 
produce discoverable discovery of electronic evidence that is ultimately 
excluded at trial.4 
 
[3] This article will discuss the parameters for the admissibility of 
electronic information from outside the U.S. in the context of trials as well 
as motions that require the support of proof in admissible form.  It will 
provide guidance to the practitioner and the court on the admissibility of 
various types of electronically stored information (“ESI”) that have been 
created, or are maintained, outside the borders of the United States.  
Section II will comprise a review of the rules for admission of evidence in 
U.S. Courts and their application to electronic evidence obtained abroad at 
various stages of the litigation lifecycle.  Section III will discuss 
challenges to the use of non-U.S. ESI arising from conduct during pretrial 
                                                            
2 See MARY MADDEN & SYDNEY JONES, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 
NETWORKED WORKERS at ii (2008), available at http://www.pewinternet. 
org/~/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Networked_Workers_FINAL.pdf.pdf; Maria Perez 
Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic 
Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2006). 
 
3 See Marissa L. P. Caylor, Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention: A Proposed 
Solution to Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts During Civil and Commercial Litigation, 
28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 342 (2010); Okezie Chukwumerije, International Judicial 
Assistance: Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 649, 650 (2005). 
 
4 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007).  See 
generally Paul W. Grimm et al. Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American 
Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored 
Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 358-61 (2009). 
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discovery.  Section IV will analyze the admissibility of non-U.S. ESI in 
motion practice.  Section V will address authentication of specific 
categories of ESI encountered in cross-border matters such as e-mails, 
instant messages and chat logs, social media sites, Internet tracking 
information, and printouts of the same. 
 
II. FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONICALLY 
STORED INFORMATION 
 
[4] The rules of evidence apply equally to evidence offered in 
electronic format and on paper.5  If anything, the rules may apply greater 
scrutiny to ESI because of concerns about the reliability of electronic 
evidence.  As Chief Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm wrote in Lorraine v. 
Markel Insurance Co., “Computerized data . . . raise[s] unique issues 
concerning [its] accuracy and authenticity.”6  Judge Grimm is not alone in 
his cautious approach to electronic evidence.  In New York v. Microsoft 
Corp., the court posited a fundamental evidentiary inquiry about e-mail, 
namely, how can one establish that e-mail is what it purports to be.7  
Similarly, Judge Grimm noted in Lorraine that whether the offered ESI is 
a chart entry, business record, or other form of proof, counsel must 
establish origins and chain of custody.8 
                                                            
5 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538; Jonathan D. Frieden & Leigh M. Murray, The 
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 RICH. J.L. 
& TECH. 5, ¶ 2 (2010). 
 
6 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 557 n.34. 
 
7 See New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233 (CKK), 2002 WL 649951, at *1 
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002).  See generally FED. R. EVID. 901 (identifying methods of 
authentication). 
 
8 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534 at 548.  Maintenance of an unbroken chain of custody cannot 
be stressed enough as a best-practice, although a kink in the chain of custody does not 
necessarily prevent the admissibility of a piece of evidence.  See United States v. 
Campbell, No. 94-30295, 1996 WL 241545, at *5-6 (9th Cir. May 9, 1996).  An audio 
recording was admitted into evidence based on testimonial evidence regarding 
characteristics of the defendant’s voice, the content of the recording, and evidence that 
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[5] These rules for evidence have long existed in the world of paper; 
however, since paper evidence is commonplace, it often does not require a 
searching inquiry.9  Courts assess electronic evidence with greater caution 
due in part to the fact that courts have far less experience with electronic 
evidence than with paper.10  Some judges are unfamiliar with technology, 
and counsel before them may not have assiduously educated the court on 
the integrity of the proffered evidence.11  Non-U.S. evidence presents 
additional levels of complication.  In the country of data creation, what 
security safeguards exist that can provide indicia of authenticity and 
reliability?  Do the indicia require live testimony or declarations, or are 
there technological markers and distinctive characteristics that can indicate 
trustworthiness and reliability?  If the data is offered through the business 
record exception to the hearsay rule, how does one prove the required 
regularity of business record-keeping practices in, for example, China, 
where such practices vary sharply from the U.S.?  Are there conflicts of 
law issues regarding privacy and security of data that impact 
                                                                                                                                                    
tape was not altered, despite a break in chain-of-custody when a recording was made of 
the tape.  Id.  The Court went on to say that “[A] defect in the chain of custody goes to 
the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence introduced."  Id. (citing United States v. 
Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1995)).  Proof of an unbroken chain of 
custody, especially with evidence travelling from outside the U.S., will help bolster 
authenticity and address any claims that foreign ESI has been compromised during its 
journey to the courtroom.  See PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 
258-59 (2005). 
 
9 See Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).  
 
10 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537; SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. ONE, 
COMMENTARY ON ESI EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY 2 (2008).  However, “when more 
judges will have been raised on computers, the suspicion in several judicial quarters 
surrounding the creation and potential alteration of ESI may diminish, and the 
requirements for admissibility may be less demanding.”  Sheldon M. Finkelstein & 
Evelyn R. Storch, Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information: It's Still the Same 
Old Story, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 45, 46 (2010).  
 
11 See Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 63 
(2009). 
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discoverability?  If so, is the party that has asserted those laws as an 
objection to discoverability then precluded from offering similar evidence 
at trial?  Finally, what are the standards for proof of the foreign laws and 
even for resolution of conflicts over language translation?   
 
[6] The rules that govern the admission of documentary evidence 
require the satisfaction of six criteria:  Relevance; Authenticity; 
Reliability; Non-Hearsay (or coverage under a hearsay exception); Best 
Evidence/Original Evidence Rule; and Probative Value vs. Prejudicial 
Effect.12  These criteria are frequently interrelated; establishment of one 
requirement may satisfy one or more of the others.13  In addition, a method 
exists by which the court may admit foreign ESI through the expediency 
of the Self-Authenticating Document Rules, which relieve the proponent 
of the need to obtain extrinsic evidence such as live testimony, 
declarations, or certifications.14 Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) 
401 admits only that ESI which has a tendency to make some 
consequential fact to the litigation more or less probable than it would 
otherwise be.15  Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.16 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538. 
 
13 See United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 499 (2d Cir. 1984); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 
539; Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence 
to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50 
JURIMETRICS J. 147, 156 (2010) (suggesting that authenticity is often a subset of 
relevance: “if evidence is not authentic, it has no relevance to the case”). 
 
14 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551; Grimm et. al., supra note 4, at 384; Randy Wilson, 
Admissibility of Web-Based Data, 52 THE ADVOC. (TEX.) 31, 31-32 (2010).  
 
15 FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .”).  
 
16 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). 
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A. Authenticity 
 
[7] If evidence meets the threshold standard for relevance, it must be 
shown to be authentic.17  Authenticity, put simply, requires proof that the 
item is, in fact, what it purports to be.18  The court will ask if the item of 
information is what counsel says it is.  For example, for a company e-mail, 
text message, database report, website, or social media posting from the 
source the proponent claims, most often the author, an entity can 
demonstrate the item’s authenticity.  Evaluating the requirements needed 
to satisfy the authenticity hurdle is more complex in the world of 
electronic evidence.  The Ninth Circuit held in In re Vinhee that “[t]he 
paperless electronic record involves a difference in the format of the 
record that presents more complicated variations on the authentication 
problem than for paper records.”19  Yet, the court noted, “(u)ltimately. . . it 
all boils down to the same question of assurance that the record is what it 
purports to be.”20  The complexity is found in the provision of such 
“assurance.”  In In re Vee Vinhnee, American Express sought to introduce 
certain electronic account records, but failed to detail the protocols for the 
computer systems holding those records and the basis of American 
Express’ assertions that it had preserved the integrity of the data.21  In 
sustaining the trial court’s decision, the Circuit court upbraided counsel 
for assumptions that led to perceived shortcomings in its offer of proof, 
and, in so doing, provided guidance on laying a proper foundation for ESI: 
 
                                                            
17 FED. R. EVID. 901(a) requires that evidence be authenticated.  This may be 
accomplished in myriad ways.  See FED. R. EVID. 901(b). 
 
18 See generally FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 
19 Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437, 
445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).  
 
20 Id.  
 
21 See id. at 442. 
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The logical questions extend beyond the identification of 
the particular computer equipment and programs used.  The 
entity's policies and procedures for the use of the 
equipment, database, and programs are important.  How 
access to the pertinent database is controlled and, 
separately, how access to the specific program is controlled 
are important questions.  How changes in the database are 
logged or recorded, as well as the structure and 
implementation of backup systems and audit procedures for 
assuring the continuing integrity of the database, are 
pertinent to the question of whether records have been 
changed since their creation.  There is little mystery to this.  
All of these questions are recognizable as analogous to 
similar questions that may be asked regarding paper files: 
policy and procedure for access and for making corrections, 
as well as the risk of tampering. But the increasing 
complexity of ever-developing computer technology 
necessitates more precise focus.22 
 
[8] As shown by the In re Vee Vinhnee opinion, courts unfamiliar with 
technology, and even those more sophisticated in the area, may require 
offers of proof, documents, and hearings to establish that the information 
being offered as authentic is what counsel says it is.23  Counsel must 
ascertain whose policies and procedures govern the creation of the 
information and determine how to get that person or entity before the 
court.  Courts have been increasingly vigilant about the foundation for 
ESI, “demanding that proponents of evidence obtained from electronically 
stored information pay more attention to the foundational requirements 
than has been customary for introducing evidence not produced from 
                                                            
22 Id. at 445. 
 
23 See generally Cooper Offenbecher, Admitting Computer Record Evidence after In Re 
Vinhnee: A Stricter Standard for the Future?, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 6 (2007) 
(examining the numerous foundation standards that courts have applied to the 
authentication of electronic records). 
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electronic sources.”24  Foundational requirements are particularly 
important for ESI produced from systems and applications in countries 
whose information governance protocols may be unfamiliar to U.S. 
judges, and “[t]he required foundation will vary not only with the 
particular circumstances but also with the individual judge.”25  However, it 
is instructive, as Magistrate Judge Grimm observed in Lorraine, that “the 
inability to get evidence admitted because of a failure to authenticate it 
almost always is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful 
advance preparation.”26 
 
[9] Authenticity and its corollary reliability may be established by an 
entity’s information management protocols, the policies, procedures and 
practices that govern the creation, storage, and transmission of non-U.S. 
ESI.  Moreover, these same protocols will be used by courts in 
establishing whether ESI satisfies the business records exception to 
hearsay.27  Often courts use the same analysis to determine whether 
electronic information qualifies for the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule.28  In other words, the practices of the company in the 
creation and maintenance of its business information may indicate to a 
court that the information has the necessary safeguards for the finder of 
fact to rely upon it.29  But what if the loci of creation, storage, and 
transmission are outside the U.S.? 
                                                            
24 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
25 See id. at 544. 
 
26 Id. at 542. 
 
27 See FED. R. EVID. 902(11); Frieden & Murray, supra note 5, ¶¶ 33-35 
 
28 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); Frieden & Murray, supra note 5, ¶33 (“This method mirrors 
the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule; therefore, courts 
often analyze it in conjunction with that exception.”).  
 
29 See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 
437, 445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).  
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[10] What if the information crosses several countries?  It is not 
uncommon for employees of multinational corporations to create business 
documents from laptops, tablets, and smartphones while travelling among 
multiple countries.30  A company network housed with a cloud provider 
may store this information on servers in still more countries and back it up 
at corporate headquarters in yet another on-site repository.31  A U.S. court, 
in exploring the basis for admission of that information, may well ask for 
proof of routinized practices governing the “life” of that information to be 
assured of its integrity, and to satisfy the criteria for the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.32   
 
[11] Frequently, information governance protocols for organizations 
located outside the U.S. use a language other than English and are drafted 
                                                            
30 See SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. SIX, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON 
DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE & DATA PROTECTION: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION & DISCOVERY OF PROTECTED DATA IN 
U.S. LITIGATION at v (E.U. ed. Dec. 2011), available at http://www.thesedonaconference. 
org/dltForm?did=IntlPrinciples2011.pdf  (“This unprecedented explosion in information 
owes in large part to ubiquitous, mobile, and easily-replicatable nature of ESI.  Today, an 
employee from a Toronto company can conduct business from a cafe [sic] in Paris, while 
sending electronic messages to customers in Dubai that attach documents from “cloud” 
servers located in Singapore, Dallas, and Amsterdam.”). 
 
31 See Alberto G. Araiza, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
8, ¶7 (“Cloud providers essentially virtualize the same physical resources (such as 
processors and storage arrays) to service multiple dispersed clients.  Cloud providers also 
divide ‘the tasks of running applications and storing data into small chunks,’ and then 
allocate the chunks among various distributed resources.” (citation omitted)). 
 
32 See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 445 (“The logical questions extend beyond the 
identification of the particular computer equipment and programs used.  The entity’s 
policies and procedures for the use of the equipment, database, and programs are 
important.  How access to the pertinent database is controlled and, separately, how access 
to the specific program is controlled are important questions.  How changes in the 
database are logged or recorded, as well as the structure and implementation of backup 
systems and audit procedures for assuring the continuing integrity of the database, are 
pertinent to the question of whether records have been changed since their creation.”).  
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and enforced pursuant to the laws of the foreign country in question.33  
While foreign laws governing the security of certain protected data may 
help establish reliability, parties may dispute the scope and applicability of 
those laws.  Preparation, though, can ease the pain, especially with regard 
to authentication of non-U.S. ESI.34 
 
[12] The evidentiary solution for the admission of foreign ESI may 
sound daunting, but as the singer Paul Simon wrote, “The answer is easy if 
you take it logically . . . .”35  Counsel can achieve that logical solution by 
taking a step-by-step approach through each of the six foundational 
requirements and documenting the support for each element.  Such 
support can take the form of pegging the various foundational 
requirements to support answers found in the entity’s information 
management procedures and laws of the countries involved in the 
information creation, maintenance, and transmission.  The journey has a 
few shortcuts.  Just as procedures for information governance intertwine 
security and privacy, the evidentiary components do not reside in silos.36  
Satisfaction of one rule may provide the answer to questions posed by 
another. 
 
B.  Reliability 
 
[13] After authenticity, the next hurdle to clear for a proponent of 
foreign ESI is reliability.  Reliability exists as an often overlooked, but 
                                                            
33 See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 
34 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
35 PAUL SIMON, 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
(Columbia Records 1975). 
 
36 See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C § 6801 (2006) (requiring financial 
institutions to follow procedures to safeguard the privacy of customer information); 
DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (D.S.C. 2004) (analyzing the 
admissibility of e-mails under Rules 902(11) and 803(6), and explaining that the analyses 
of authentication and hearsay are intertwined). 
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critical, subset of authenticity.37  The Manual for Complex Litigation 
instructs that courts should “consider the accuracy and reliability of 
computerized evidence” and the “proponent of computerized evidence has 
the burden of laying a proper foundation by establishing its accuracy.”38 
 
[14] In the United States, reliability can be shown by reference to 
procedures for transferring ESI, such as documentation showing the 
policies and security controls for maintaining the integrity of information 
in storage and in motion—i.e., logged in and out at the recipient’s 
repository—to establish a chain of custody.39  Metadata and unique 
characteristics inherent in a piece of electronic information (i.e. a hash 
value) may demonstrate that parties have not altered data.40  Statutory or 
regulatory compliance may also indicate reliability.41  Showing that these 
provisions were followed can help meet the requirement of proof that the 
proffered evidence remains unaltered and, thus, is reliable (although, of 
course, this showing is more easily made with documented policies and 
procedures for sending, receiving, and storing the information in a secure 
                                                            
37 See Connecticut v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 942-43 (Conn. 2004) (“In addition to the 
reliability of the evidence itself, what must be established is the reliability of the 
procedures involved . . . .”). 
 
38 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004). 
 
39 See generally Christy Burke, Examining E-Discovery Chain of Custody, LAW.COM 
(Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp? 
id=900005494089 (explaining the importance of logging the chain of custody of ESI). 
 
40 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546-48 (D. Md. 2007) 
(explaining that the use of hash values and the examination of metadata can be used as 
methods of authenticating electronic evidence).  
 
41 See, e.g., Steve Apiki, Sarbanes-Oxley: Driving the Storage Compliance Boom, 
ENTERPRISESTORAGEFORUM.COM (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.enterprisestorageforum. 
com/continuity/features/article.php/3485651 (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
requires that data integrity be maintained over a retention period, which can serve to help 
in the authentication of stored documents by ensuring they are original). 
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fashion).42 
 
[15] Similarly, data protection statutes, which mandate safeguards for 
data sent beyond a country’s borders, can assist counsel in establishing 
data integrity.43  For example, regulations drafted under Israel’s Protection 
of Privacy Act pertaining to personal data in databases protect that 
information by requiring that the recipient of the database information 
safeguard it as though it were located in Israel.44  Israel’s Protection of 
Privacy Act comprises very specific requirements to control entry of data, 
access to data, and transfers of data from those databases.45  Argentina’s 
Personal Data Protection Act and regulations promulgated thereunder also 
provide stringent provisions for the security of personal data in databases 
and prohibit the transfer of such information unless the recipient can 
provide similar safeguards.46  Thus, a showing by the proponent of such 
evidence of regulatory and statutory requirements preserving the integrity 
of the data, along with testimony or a certification that the regulations and 
statutes as pertinent were followed, can satisfy the foundational burden of 
reliability.47  The proponents and opponents of such evidence, then, should 
                                                            
42 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 545 (“It is necessary, however, that the authenticating 
witness provide factual specificity about the process by which the electronically stored 
information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change 
or the process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so . . . 
.”). 
 
43 E.g. Privacy Protection (Transfer of Databases Abroad) Regulations, 2001, KT 5761, 
1-2 (Isr.). 
 
44 Id.  
 
45 Protection of Privacy Law 5741-1981, SH No. 196 p. Chapter 2, Article 1 (Isr.) (such 
as forbidding possession of a database without registration, and even forbidding use of a 
database “except for the purposes for which the data base was set up.”). 
 
46 Law No. 25326, Oct. 4, 2000, A.D.L.A. 5426 (Arg.); Decree No. 1558, Dec. 3, 2001, 
XXIX A.D.L.A. 1558 (Arg.). 
 
47 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 545; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 
11.446 (2004). 
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familiarize themselves with the applicable non-U.S. data protection 
provisions. 
 
C.  Hearsay 
 
[16] The criterion that evidence is not hearsay, or falls within an 
exception to the hearsay rule, requires the court first to determine whether 
the computerized information in question is indeed hearsay.  Hearsay is: 
(1) an assertive statement; (2) made by a human declarant; (3) offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted; and (4) not excluded from the definition of 
hearsay because it is: (a) an opposing party’s statement as understood by 
F.R.E. 801(d)(2); or (b) a prior testimonial statement covered by F.R.E. 
801(d)(1).48  If ESI constitutes hearsay, it is inadmissible unless it falls 
within one of the recognized exceptions to hearsay statements.49   
 
[17] Insofar as ESI is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 
all ESI is hearsay, provided the data offered is a statement of a declarant 
and not machine-generated, such as a computerized readout.50  The 
exception to the hearsay rule most commonly applicable to ESI is the 
business records exception.51  How does one establish the requisite 
showing of routinized information creation, storage, and maintenance 
procedures for locations outside the U.S. and what is the level of proof 
required to get that information before a finder of fact?  The initiative 
breaks down into two categories: (1) enterprise protocols; and (2) laws 
                                                            
48 FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay generally as “a statement that: (1) the declarant 
does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing, and (2) a party offers in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”). 
 
49 See FED. R. EVID. 802.  
 
50 See Charles Albert Ross, Evidentiary Issues Regarding Electronically Stored 
Information, AVVO (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:01 PM), http;//www.avvo.com/legal-
guides/ugc/evidentiary-issues-regarding-electronically-stored-information.  
 
51 Id. 
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that may assist in the establishment of the requisite showing.  On this latter 
point, one must also ascertain how to prove the existence of the foreign 
laws and regulations. 
 
[18] Perhaps the most obvious challenge to foreign ESI falling under 
the business records exception is an allegation that the information was 
not created or managed pursuant to reliable business practices.  The 
defense, accordingly, would need to show that the documents were created 
and managed by sound processes.52  How does one establish the existence 
of reliable practices?  One of the many struggles that multi-national 
practitioners face is that courts have inconsistently applied the rules of 
evidence in this area.53  This is perhaps due to a lack of effort by counsel 
to educate the court on the technology at issue and the indicia of reliability 
of the information (or, in the cases in which courts have admitted the 
evidence without much analysis, lack thereof).  The responsibility, Judge 
Grimm has noted, is with counsel, in that “they must be the ones to 
identify reliability/trustworthiness problems with digital business records, 
develop the facts to challenge them, and argue to the courts why the 
exception is inapplicable and why the proffered evidence should be 
excluded.”54  Of course, the inverse is equally true, significantly so in the 
case of non-U.S. ESI: the proponent of the evidence must be sufficiently 
versed in the non-U.S. information management protocols that support the 
admission of this evidence.55  Counsel must show that the information 
offered meets the oft-intertwined criteria of reliability and the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule. 
 
[19] There exists considerable overlap between the requirements of 
authenticity and those pertaining to establishment of the ESI as a business 
                                                            
52 See Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 376.   
 
53 See id. at 407-09. 
 
54 See id. at 409. 
 
55 See infra Part I.G (discussing non-U.S. management protocols). 
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record.  In In re Vee Vinhnee, the court noted that satisfaction of the 
authenticity requirement calls for, among other things, proof (itself in 
admissible form) of internal protocols.  “[P]olicies and procedures for the 
use of the equipment, database, and programs are important.  How access 
to the [information] is controlled and, separately, how access to the 
specific program is controlled are important questions . . . [as well as] 
audit procedures for assuring the continuing integrity of the [information] 
. . . .”56  In a similar manner, establishment of evidence as a business 
record requires a degree of trustworthiness of the electronic information as 
a business record, and that trustworthiness must be proven by business 
protocols, such as:  
 
evidence to make a clear showing that the digital evidence 
relates to a regular activity of the business itself, as 
opposed to the personal use of its creator, and that the 
business imposed on the employee a requirement to make a 
digital record of the occurrence, and thereafter to maintain 
that record for purposes of the future use by the company.57   
 
In other words, as the court in In re Vee Vinhnee noted, “the authenticity 
analysis is merged into the business record analysis. . . .”58 
 
[20] Cross-border distinctions in business practices can trap the unwary 
practitioner and perhaps even the court.  A question may arise as to 
cultural distinctions in business practices, in that the information 
management practices of non-U.S. entities may differ from those typically 
seen in the U.S.59  If practices differ, will they meet the level of scrutiny 
                                                            
56 Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437, 
445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  
 
57 Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 405.  
 
58 See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 444. 
 
59 David O. Stephens, Putting on a Global Face, DOCUMENTMEDIA.COM, 
http://documentmedia.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=Content+Library&type=Publishi
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required for a foundation for ESI?  If the entity permits its employees to 
use company computers to send and receive personal communications, 
does this dilute the business practice with regard to company e-mails and, 
if so, to what extent?  Does the analysis change in light of the fact that 
permission for occasional personal use of company networks is standard in 
many U.S. industries (discussed further, infra, in Section V)?60  Opponents 
of ESI may find it difficult to challenge the practice on the basis that 
personal use is permitted because, in the case of evidence emanating from 
an E.U. Member State, local legislation often proscribes the monitoring of 
employee network use that could reveal extensive personal 
communications.61  
 
[21] Foreign ESI comprising public records may be admissible under 
the F.R.E. 803(8) hearsay exception for public records and reports.62  Non-
U.S. public records may also be admitted, if meeting all other evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                                    
ng&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791
&tier=4&id=EFF25A90A11C4461B855E0037F5814AE (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 
60 See Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 405 (noting that courts that appreciate this subtlety 
“are more likely to be inclined to require strict adherence to each element of Rule 
803(6)”).  
 
61 See, e.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14, 
2003, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] [Federal Law Gazette I] at 66, § 20, as 
amended, Aug. 14, 2009, BGBL. I at 2814 (Ger.), available at http://www.bfdi.bun 
d.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/1086936/publicationFile/87545/BDSG_idFv01092009.pdf; 
Personal Data Protection Code, Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2003, n. 196, Title X, Ch. 1, 
Sec. 121-23 (It.), available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/docum ent?ID= 
1219452; [Act on the Protection of Personal Information], Law No. 57 of 2003, art. 27 
(Japan), available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf. 
 
62 FED. R. EVID. 803(8); see also Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398, 
412 (6th Cir. 2007) (admitting Korean arrest notices, complaint and investigative reports 
under FED. R. EVID. 803(8)); infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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criteria, under the residual hearsay exception of F.R.E. 807.63  This “catch-
all” section provides that a statement that does not fit within the other 
enumerated exceptions but comprises “circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness” may be admitted if offered under the following 
circumstances, “as evidence of a material fact; . . . is more probative on 
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent 
can obtain through reasonable efforts; and . . . admitting it will best serve 
the purposes of these rules and the interest of justice.”64  The proponent 
must provide advance notice to his or her adversary of the intent to utilize 
this exception, including the declarant’s name and address.65  F.R.E. 807 
has even been the basis for admission of negative evidence, such as proof 
that certain information was not contained in the records of a foreign 
government.66 
 
D.   Preservation and Regularity of Foreign Business  
Information Generation 
 
[22] Questions of preservation of foreign ESI may enter into the 
analysis as well.  F.R.E. 803 requires that the information be “kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted activity of a business.”67  Judge Grimm 
observed that “it may be difficult to show that the e-mails are ‘kept’ for a 
‘business activity’ if they are routinely and automatically deleted without 
                                                            
63 FED. R. EVID. 807 (explaining certain circumstances in which hearsay statements are 
not excluded, even when not covered by a hearsay exception in FED. R. EVID. 803 or 
804). 
 
64 Id. 
 
65 Id.; see also United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(involving an arrangement between U.S. and Panama, which was established through 
series of teletype messages received by captain of U.S. Coast Guard ship). 
 
66 See, e.g., United States v. Cahill, No. 85 CR 773, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6350, at *8-9 
(N.D. Ill. June 28, 1988). 
 
67 FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (emphasis added). 
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being saved to a file where they will continue to be available for business 
purposes.”68 
 
[23] Of course, “keeping,” or “preserving” the information for business 
purposes may not seem to be an obvious issue, i.e. if counsel have the 
information available for proffer at trial, they clearly have “kept,” or 
“preserved” it in some respect.69  The issue will arise when adversary 
counsel attempt to challenge the offer of evidence by showing that there is 
no established protocol for such preservation.  Counsel can, perhaps, 
counter this argument with proof that preservation policies outside the 
U.S. often differ from those of American companies and that local laws 
and regional directives may be further restrictive.70  Therefore, showing a 
lack of an American-style preservation policy may not, without more, 
sustain an objection to the evidence.   
 
[24] To further complicate matters, preservation in the U.S. sense may, 
in many parts of the world, actually violate local law.  Within the 
European Union, “personal data” —data that can be traced to an 
identifiable person—is protected under Privacy Directive 95/46/EC.71  All 
E.U. member states have implemented this Directive by local law, as 
required by the terms of the Directive.72  Because it is possible to trace e-
mail, perhaps the most sought-after form of electronic evidence, to a 
                                                            
68 Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 406. 
 
69 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 
70 The conundrum is similar to that for the admissibility standard.  See supra notes 60-61 
and accompanying text; infra Section V. 
 
71 See generally Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive] (protecting individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data). 
 
72 Directive, supra note 71. 
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named sender and/or recipient, it thus constitutes “personal data.”73  The 
Directive only allows the “processing” of personal data for limited 
purposes.74  The Directive defines “processing” broadly, as “any . . . set of 
operations . . . [including but not limited to] collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”75  The 
European Commission Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection has 
opined that preservation constitutes a form of processing.76 
 
[25] Certain countries, including Germany, France, Korea, Japan, and 
Italy, mandate the deletion of protected data after accomplishing the 
purpose for which the data was collected.77  In other jurisdictions, business 
                                                            
73 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, 
OPINION 4/2007 ON THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DATA (2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf. 
 
74 See Directive, supra note 71 (defining “processing” and saying that member states 
should protect fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular the right to privacy with 
respect to processing personal data). 
 
75 Id. (emphasis added) (stating that while the United States does not consider certain 
kinds of personal data storage as processing, Directive 95/46 considers any “retention, 
preservation, or archiving of data for such purposes” as processing). 
 
76 European Commission, Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 1/2009 on 
Pre-Trial Discovery for Cross Border Civil Litigation, at 8 (European Comm’n Working 
Paper No. 158, 2009) [hereinafter EU Working Document], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp158_en.pdf. 
 
77 See Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux liberties, 
[Act No. 78-17 of 6 Jan. 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files, and Civil 
Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227; Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data 
Protection Act], Jan. 14, 2003, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] [Federal Law 
Gazette I] at 66, § 20, as amended, Aug. 14, 2009, BGBL. I at 2814 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/1086936/publicationFile/87545/BDSG_
idFv01092009.pdf; Personal Data Protection Code, Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2003, n. 
196 (It.), available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/document?ID=1219452; [Act 
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tradition allows the individual employee to decide whether to retain 
business data, whereas in the U.S., an enterprise-wide policy may govern 
retention of important business information.78 
 
[26] A comprehensive understanding of what these laws, regulations, 
and opinions prohibit and permit, with regard to the “keeping” of 
information, is critical for those who would proffer such evidence, as well 
as those who would challenge its admission. 
 
E.  Best Evidence/Original Evidence Rule 
 
[27] The best evidence/original evidence rule is the last of the 
evidentiary hurdles that counsel must clear in order to successfully admit 
ESI.79  Under F.R.E. 1002, the original “writing, recording, or 
                                                                                                                                                    
on the Protection of Personal Information], Law No. 57 of 2003, art. 27 (Japan), 
translated at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf; Chan-Mo Chung, 
Korea’s Recent Legislation on Online Data Protection, 6 PRIVACY L. & POL’Y REP. 38 
(1999), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1999/46.html. 
 
78 Compare Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that Counsel did not meet the 
standard for a litigation hold, in part, by instructing plaintiffs to be over-, rather than 
under-, inclusive in collecting and preserving documents since that directive placed “total 
reliance on the employee to search and select what that employee believed to be 
responsive records without any supervision from Counsel”), and Phillip M. Adams & 
Assocs., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1194 (D. Utah 2009) (holding that 
defendant had violated its duty to preserve information, in part because the defendant's 
preservation practices “place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what 
information is relevant”), with Io Group Inc. v. GLBT Ltd., No. C-10-1282 MMC 
(DMR), 2011 WL 4974337, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (finding an adverse inference 
charge warranted where the UK defendant admitted deleting e-mails, after receiving 
several litigation hold notices, on advice of UK counsel that e-mail retention violated the 
Data Protection Act).  
 
79 See generally FED. R. EVID. 1001-1008 (outlining the requirements for the best 
evidence rule). 
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photograph” is required when it is being offered to prove its content.80  
When the original is not available, duplicates are admissible under certain 
circumstances pursuant to F.R.E. 1003.81  Thus, provided the printout of a 
website or other electronic record accurately reflects the original and no 
impropriety is alleged, such as an incomplete or altered record, an e-mail 
or database printout should meet the requirements of the original evidence 
rule.82  Other exceptions to the original evidence rule include when the 
original or any duplicates of the electronic document have been lost or 
destroyed absent bad faith by the proponent, and are unavailable by any 
judicial process, remain in the possession of an opposing party on notice 
that it would be a subject of proof, or prove not relevant to a controlling 
issue.83  Under these circumstances, a party may submit proof of the 
contents of the ESI through secondary evidence.84 
 
[28] Proof of various laws and regulations, such as Argentina’s 
aforementioned Personal Data Protection Act and Israel’s Protection of 
                                                            
80 FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 
81 See generally FED. R. EVID. 1003; see also United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (excluding testimony as to readings of GPS on ground best evidence was a 
screen shot or printout); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 576 (D. Md. 
2007) (citing People v. Huehn, 53 P.3d 733, 738 (Colo. App. 2002)) (“[Rule 1003] 
essentially provides that duplicates are co-extensively admissible as originals, unless 
there is a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the original, or the circumstances indicate 
that it would be unfair to admit a duplicate in lieu of an original.”). 
 
82 Recall, however, some courts will approach ESI with skepticism.  See, e.g., St. Clair v. 
Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“While some 
look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the Court continues to 
warily and wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and 
misinformation.”).  Even so, recently published decisions seem to indicate that the 
opponent must do more than simply suggest that a document may have been altered.  See 
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 
83 See FED. R. EVID. 1004.  
 
84 See FED. R. EVID. 1004 advisory committee’s note. 
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Privacy Act, may also assist with meeting the evidentiary burdens under 
the best evidence/original evidence rule.85  For example, Israeli law may 
proscribe transfer of the database, in which case counsel may offer a 
report of the database.86  Counsel offering the evidence should be familiar 
with the applicable provisions of non-U.S. law, so that he or she may have 
a basis for the offer of the report in the absence of the actual database.  Of 
course, practicalities should also enter into the argument; it is difficult to 
export an entire database and impractical to do so for only a few entries, 
notwithstanding the fact that juries may not have the patience or 
wherewithal to review an entire database.  It is particularly critical that 
counsel seeking to challenge such truncated evidence on the ground that it 
is incomplete or inaccurate, be familiar with the need for, and quantum of, 
extrinsic evidence, especially since counsel must make an objection based 
on the original evidence rule at the time or risk waiver.87  Section V below 
offers practical steps for offering proof of non-U.S. information protocols, 
laws, and regulations.  
 
F.  Self-Authentication: Is the Easier Path Available? 
 
[29] The proponent of electronic evidence can avert a great deal of 
effort by establishing that the information offered is self-authenticating 
pursuant to F.R.E. 902, or state law equivalents,88 which set forth 
categories of evidence which do not require extrinsic evidence as a 
condition precedent to admissibility.89  F.R.E. 902(5) concerns 
                                                            
85 See supra Part I.B.  
 
86 See Privacy Protection (Transfer of Databases Abroad) Regulations, 2001, KT 5761, 1-
2 (Isr.). 
 
87 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 579 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
88 See FED. R. EVID. 902; see, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4542(a) (CONSOL. 2011).  
 
89 See FED. R. EVID. 902.  
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governmental or public authority records.90  If the ESI (including website 
information) contains reliable indicia that it is a public record, it may be 
admitted without secondary evidence of authenticity unless the nature of 
the ESI as emanating from a governmental authority faces challenges on 
other grounds (i.e., relevance, prejudice, hearsay, etc.).91  Pursuant to 
F.R.E. 902(4), the ESI may be deemed self-authenticated if appropriately 
certified by official record, and thus admissible pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 44(a)(2).92  In a like fashion, F.R.E. 
902(12) holds that non-U.S. ESI may be self-authenticating if it is shown, 
by appropriate certification, as the product of regularly conducted foreign 
business activity.93 
 
[30] The Advisory Committee notes to F.R.C.P. 44(a)(2) explicitly 
reference and reproduce in full a treaty known as the Hague Convention 
on Abolishing the Requirement for Legalization of Foreign Public 
Documents (also known as the Hague Legalization Convention or The 
Apostille Convention).94  It may provide an expedient for counsel to have 
official documents covered by the treaty admitted under the public records 
exception, if a public authority or representative of a public authority in a 
signatory state has certified the documents.95  The United States is a 
                                                            
90 FED. R. EVID. 902(5). 
 
91 See FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee’s note. 
 
92 FED. R. EVID. 902(4); see FED. R. CIV. P. 44(a)(2). 
 
93 FED. R. EVID. 902(12). 
 
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 44 advisory committee’s note.   
 
95 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, OUTLINE HAGUE 
APOSTILLE CONVENTION (2009) [hereinafter HAGUE OUTLINE], available at 
www.hcch.net/upload/outline12e.pdf. 
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signatory state.96  The U.S. State Department notes that “[t]he treaty 
reduces the burden of the cumbersome ‘chain of authentication’ method of 
certifying documents which requires a long series of certificates.”97  The 
certification, to be appended to the document, is known as an Apostille.98  
It contains ten elements, including country, language, and the capacity of 
the individual who has certified the document.99  In this way, the treaty 
may suffice to deem public documents from a signatory country to fit 
within the F.R.E. 902(5) provision for self-authentication.100  Yet the 
Convention is not the panacea for evidentiary foundation it may at first 
seem.  First, the treaty applies only to public documents, though the 
definition of a “public document” varies between signatory countries.101  
U.S. counsel, in this regard, would be well-advised to obtain local counsel 
in the country of origin of the ESI.  Second, the Convention dates from 
1961, and only provides for Apostilles in paper form, to affix to paper 
documents.102  The Hague Conference on Private International Law has 
recommended the adoption of electronic Apostilles, or “e-Apps,” for use 
                                                            
96 See Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public 
Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 527 U.N.T.S. 189, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_ 
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=41. 
 
97 Judicial Assistance – Notarial and Authentication (Apostille), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
[hereinafter Judicial Assistance], http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_2545.html#3 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2012).  
 
98 Id. 
 
99 See id.  The Apostille comprises ten elements, including country, name of signer, 
function of signer, authority of signer, and Apostille registration number.  See Model of 
Certificate, HAGUE CONF. ON INT’L L., hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/apostille.pdf. 
 
100 See generally FED. R. EVID. 902(5). 
 
101 See HAGUE OUTLINE, supra note 95; Judicial Assistance, supra note 97.  
 
102 See Judicial Assistance, supra note 97 (noting a variety of methods to affix the 
Apostille, including “rubber stamp, glue, ribbons, wax seals, impressed seals, self-
adhesive stickers, etc.”). 
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with documents in electronic format and, to that end, has facilitated a Pilot 
Program for the use of e-Apps.103  Not all signatory countries have 
adopted the e-App, however, and therefore the utility of the Convention 
for foreign ESI is limited to data and electronic documents from 
participating signatory states.104  
 
[31] The inability to obtain an appropriate certification does not 
necessarily prove fatal to self-authentication of foreign public records.  If 
the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to investigate the 
authenticity and accuracy of the records, counsel may offer an attested 
copy without certification upon an appropriate showing of good cause.105   
 
[32] F.R.E. 902(7) provides for self-authentication if the record bears 
“[A]n inscription, sign, tag or label purporting to have been affixed in the 
course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control.”106  At 
first glance, this would appear to cover foreign e-mail that bears signature 
stamps or signature blocks of the corporate entity from which it emanated.  
Judge Grimm has cautioned, though, that “simply because an individual’s 
sending address is present on an e-mail does not constitute definitive proof 
that the person actually sent the e-mail, and authentication of an e-mail 
could still possibly require testimony from a person with personal 
knowledge of the transmission or its receipt to ensure its 
                                                            
103 See Closer and Closer to Reality: The e-Apostille Pilot Program of the HCCH and the 
NNA, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 (2006), 
www.hcch.net/upload/e-app-fnl.pdf. 
 
104 Operational e-Registers by State, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=146 (last visited Feb. 16, 
2012).  
 
105 See In re Letter of Request from Boras Dist. Court, Swed., 153 F.R.D. 31, 35-36 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also United States v. Yousef, 175 F.R.D. 192, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 
106 FED. R. EVID. 902(7). 
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trustworthiness.”107  Indeed, he also notes that as of 2009, “no case since 
Lorraine has discussed the use of [F.R.E.] Rule 902(7) to gauge the 
authenticity of an e-mail.”108  
 
[33] F.R.E. 902(12) may prove the most efficient path to admission, for 
at least certain types of ESI.  F.R.E. 902(12) specifically concerns 
“Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.”109  By 
reference to F.R.E. 902(11), this provision requires that the evidence be 
admissible under F.R.E. 803(6)(A)-(C) (a business records exception for 
“Records of Regularly Conducted Activity”), if accompanied by a 
declaration certifying:  
 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from 
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;  
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted activity of a business . . .; and  
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that 
activity.110 
 
                                                            
107 Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 389. 
 
108 Id.  Consider that the absence of supportive case law may not necessarily indicate an 
unwillingness on the part of the judiciary to allow for the self-authentication of foreign 
ESI pursuant to F.R.E. 902(7), but rather, that F.R.E. 902(7) foundations may have gone 
unutilized or unchallenged.  Accordingly, counsel should not rule out admission via 
F.R.E. 902(7), in the absence of better foundational avenues, or as a last resort. 
 
109 FED. R. EVID. 902(12).  Congress amended FED. R. EVID. 902 in 2010 to include 
subdivisions (11) and (12).  As noted by the advisory committee, the rule “sets forth a 
procedure by which parties can authenticate certain records of regularly conducted 
activity, other than through the testimony of a foundation witness,” and 902(12) serves as 
the civil analog to 18 USC § 3505, enacted in 1984, which provides a means for 
certifying foreign records of regularly conducted activity in criminal cases.  FED R. EVID. 
902 advisory committee’s note; see United States v. Laurent, No. 04-4745, 2006 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 6023, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006). 
 
110 FED. R. EVID 803(6). 
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[34] Furthermore, “[t]he declaration must be signed in a manner that, if 
falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal penalty in the country 
where the certification is signed.”111  In St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. 
FDIC, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida admitted 
bank records from a bank in El Salvador, after affording the FDIC an 
opportunity to obtain proper certification of a declaration that had 
appropriately demonstrated the above-mentioned four elements.112  The 
court took judicial notice of a Salvadoran law that banking institutions in 
El Salvador must provide data and information regarding their operations 
and activities when requested by the Financial System of El Salvador 
(SSF).113  The court found that the person certifying the records was 
“qualified” because his position and experience demonstrated sufficient 
familiarity with the records such that he could attest to the reliability of the 
banking records:   
 
[He] has been the superintendent and president of the board 
of directors of the SSF, the SSF oversees and regulates El 
Salvador's financial system; under Salvadoran law, banking 
institutions, such as Banco Cuscatlán, are required to 
provide data and information regarding their operations and 
activities when requested by the SSF. Based on these 
criteria, the Court . . . determined that [the certifying 
declarant’s] position and experience demonstrate[d] . . . 
sufficient familiarity with these types of records such that 
he is qualified to attest to the reliability of the records at 
issue here.114 
                                                            
111 FED. R. EVID. 902(12). 
 
112 See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. FDIC, No. 08-21192-CIV-GARBER, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 62604, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2011).  See generally St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. 
FDIC, No. 08-21192-CIV-GARBER, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103135, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 13, 2011). 
 
113 See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62604, at *4. 
 
114 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10315, at *7. 
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The court also concluded that in meeting the four elements of F.R.E. 
902(12), the proponent had satisfied the requirements of the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule.115  Similarly, in United States v. 
Laurent, a matter concerning a fraudulent visa application, the trial court 
apparently permitted the government to admit a visa application from 
Estonia with the condition that the government ultimately produce a 
certification to authenticate the document (which it did not have at that 
time), or else the court would “back [the document] out” of evidence.116  
 
[35] Meeting all the elements necessary to demonstrate the 
trustworthiness of a document frequently takes on heightened significance 
when the source of the evidence comes from beyond U.S. borders.  For 
example, in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, medical evidence from 
Guatemala, which consisted of testimony from an attending physician and 
medical notes, did not meet the requirements of F.R.E. 902(12), as the 
documents were neither an original nor duplicate of certified foreign 
records of regularly conducted activity admissible under F.R.E. 803(6).117  
Yet, in United States v. Parker, involving cases of Dewars Scotch lifted 
from a foreign carrier shipment, a United Kingdom certificate for exports 
to the U.S. was admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under F.R.E. 
803(6) because “circumstantial evidence and testimony suggested 
trustworthiness.”118  While the document was not authenticated under 
F.R.E. 902(12) (i.e., it was not self-authenticated via certification), the 
court found the testimony of the sole U.S. importer for Dewar's Scotch 
amply demonstrated the trustworthiness of the document and showed the 
document was a business record.119  Here, the nature of the document 
                                                            
115 Id. at *11. 
 
116 See United States v. Laurent, No. 04-4745, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6023, at *5 (4th 
Cir. Mar. 10, 2006). 
 
117 See Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156–57 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 
118 United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 
119 Id. 
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indicated to the court its reliability and authenticity and justified its 
admission as an exception to the hearsay rule.120    
 
[36] The declaration requirement sounds very much like the foundation 
requirements for admission under the business records hearsay exception, 
described above, but the comparison’s ease may be deceptive.  One may 
not always have success in obtaining such a declaration, due to the 
information management practices of the entity in question or 
recalcitrance of the entity to submit such a declaration.121  Non-e-mail 
communications, such as text messages, Instant Messages, and blog and 
social media posts, may not rise to the “regular activity” requirement of 
F.R.E. 902(12) or, for that matter, F.R.E. 803(6).122  The “regular activity” 
criterion, along with temporal requirements (“made at or near the time of 
the occurrence”), and the F.R.E. 803(6) criterion that the evidence be 
created by a person “with knowledge” and pursuant to a “business 
activity,” may provide grounds for challenge, but it is important to keep in 
mind that these terms and categories may have entirely different meanings 
and uses outside the U.S. due to linguistic issues, business practices, and 
cultural distinctions.123 
 
G.  Proof of Non-U.S. Information Protocols, Laws and 
Regulations and Language Translation 
 
[37] Where extrinsic evidence is required to authenticate foreign ESI, 
                                                            
120 See id.  The witness specifically testified that “[the] document was a customs 
certificate of the United Kingdom representing proof that the Scotch had been imported 
and thus the purchaser could avoid taxation in the United Kingdom for the cases of 
Scotch listed on the certificate.” Id.  But see discussion of admissibility under the F.R.E. 
807(b) residual exception to the hearsay rule, supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
 
121 Compare FED. R. EVID. 902(12), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 
122 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); FED. R. EVID. 902(12). 
 
123 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); FED. R. EVID. 902(12); supra Part I.B. 
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what form should it take?  How does one go about proving foreign law 
and regulations?  The first practical suggestion is for the parties to agree 
on translation of the language(s) used by the authors of the evidence, for 
both the evidence itself as well as the extrinsic matters offered in support 
of the evidence.  If no agreement exists, the court may order the 
translators’ documents, or a hearing for the conflicting versions pursuant 
to F.R.E. 702.124 
 
1. The Declaration has been discussed above with regard to the 
certification of the need to dispense with extrinsic evidence, 
but a declaration of a different sort may serve to provide the 
necessary evidence of the computer and information 
management protocols that demonstrate indicia of reliability, as 
well as the regularity of the particular electronic activity in 
order to fit the evidence under one of the hearsay exceptions.125  
The practitioner should pay careful attention to the court’s 
rules as to how far in advance of the trial, if at all, such 
declarations must be served upon the other parties, and whether 
the declarant may be subject to deposition. 
2. A Witness with Knowledge of the Facts is often the most 
compelling support of the offer of proof.  The witness can 
testify to a host of subjects, such as authenticity by virtue of the 
witness’s knowledge of the information (i.e., he or she sent or 
received it), computer systems and information governance 
policies and procedures, identifying characteristics of the data, 
or business regularity with which the proffered types of data 
are created or received.126 
3. Testimony of an Expert is particularly useful where one 
challenges, or must defend a challenge to, the reliability of the 
                                                            
124 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 
125 See generally supra Part I.F.  
 
126 See RICE, supra note 8, at 229-230, 232, 251.  See generally FED. R. EVID. 901(B)(1). 
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system or applications that created the proffered data or the 
chain of custody for the data.  Among other subjects 
appropriate for expert testimony are (i) the distinctive 
characteristics of the proffered evidence (hash values, 
metadata, replies to e-mails, etc.) (these may not require expert 
testimony, depending upon prior rulings and the style of the 
case),127 (ii) the system’s capacity to produce reliable 
information by virtue of its architecture, configuration, and 
maintenance, and (iii) the training of both the IT staff tasked 
with maintaining target systems as well as the end-users of 
those systems.  However, the expert may be subject to the 
requirement for preparation and service of a report and for 
deposition pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26 or 30(b)(6).128  The expert’s 
potential testimony may also be subject to challenge under 
F.R.E. 702-704 and pursuant (depending upon the state) to 
preclusion motions and hearings pursuant to Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals129 or Frye v. United States.130 
4. Certifications of Non-U.S. Counsel may be warranted to prove 
non-U.S. law.  These may be challenged pursuant to F.R.E. 
702, particularly if there are conflicting schools of thought on 
the scope of the particular law or regulations.  The court may 
(and most often will) research the law on its own.131  
Instructive on this point in this regard is the case of In re 
Rivastigmine Patent Litigation,132 in which the court, faced 
                                                            
127 See Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 392. 
 
128 See id. at 377.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 
129 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 
130 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 
131 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 
132 237 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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with voluminous privilege logs comprising objections to data 
produced from nearly forty countries, ruled upon the quantum 
and quality of proof of privilege in the subject countries.133  
Where there was no support from an affidavit of counsel from 
the subject country, or the affidavit did not provide sufficient 
information for the court to assess the assertion of privilege, 
the court ordered production of the disputed data.134  
5. Translations should be the subject of agreement between 
counsel but, in litigation, the most obvious subjects for 
cooperation between counsel may become contentious and 
lengthy battles.  While there is no requirement that non-U.S. 
data created in another language be translated in English for 
production in discovery,135 the information cannot be offered 
into evidence unless translated into English.  An inability to 
reach agreement on translation, such as may occur with regard 
to dialects in Chinese or Hindi, may result in a F.R.E. 702 
hearing on the correct English iteration of the evidence.136  
Discussion of these issues early in the litigation may result in 
agreement that can avoid the time and expense of such 
hearings. 
 
[38] Even after counsel has undergone the often arduous task of 
retrieving foreign-based ESI and clearing all of the aforementioned 
admissibility hurdles, courts may nonetheless exclude relevant ESI on one 
                                                            
133 See id. at 87-88. 
 
134 See id. at 84. 
 
135 See In re P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 509 n.3 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Congress 
could perhaps impose such a rule if it so desired, but the present Federal Rules provide no 
authority for such an extraordinary burden on foreign parties.”). 
 
136 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that the 
trial judge’s gatekeeping function to determine reliability of evidence applies to all expert 
testimony).  See generally FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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or more of the grounds articulated in F.R.E. 403 (i.e., unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, undue delay, etc.).137 
 
III. CHALLENGES TO ADMISSIBILITY BASED ON PRETRIAL 
DISCOVERY CONDUCT 
 
[39] Circumstances in which counsel may be precluded from using 
otherwise admissible non-U.S. information include the failure to comply 
with discovery orders, or to comply with notice requirements.138  While 
such compliance is not a strictly evidentiary criterion, from a practical 
standpoint, litigation counsel should remain cognizant of the consequences 
of such omissions and other activities during discovery.139  For example, 
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), provided the lawsuit is not an action 
described in F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(B), or unless otherwise ordered or 
stipulated: 
 
[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to the other parties… a copy—or a description by 
category and location—of all documents, electronically 
stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing 
party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use 
                                                            
137 See generally FED. R. EVID. 403 (precluding evidence in ESI cases, which may arise 
where there are confusing voluminous records, biased record summaries, computer 
animations that portray a matter unfairly, or electronic or text messages that contain 
highly offensive or derogatory language).  This article will not focus on prejudice, but the 
reader is instructed to note that, as with paper documents, the proponent of any ESI must 
be prepared to argue not only relevance, but that the evidence’s relevance preponderates 
over any unfair prejudice (as well as any other applicable exclusionary F.R.E. 403 
factors). 
 
138 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (c)(1). 
 
139 See, e.g., Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Alaska 2005) 
(noting that the burden is on the disclosing party to ensure disclosure is complete and 
excluding documents not properly disclosed). 
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to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be 
solely for impeachment.140 
 
[40] Under F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(E), failing to fully investigate the case, 
challenging the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures, or the other 
party’s failure to make its initial disclosures, will not excuse a party from 
making its F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) disclosures and may result in sanctions, 
including but not limited to, preclusion of certain evidence.141  Moreover, 
F.R.C.P. 37 allows the court to impose broad sanctions for discovery-
related abuses, and in the case of bad faith, the court may impose 
sanctions based on its “inherent power to manage its own affairs.”142  
F.R.C.P. 37(c)(1) specifically provides that evidence will be excluded for 
failure to comply with F.R.C.P. 26(a) under certain conditions:  
 
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness 
as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to 
use that information or witness to supply evidence on a 
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was 
substantially justified or was harmless.143   
 
[41] Thus, F.R.C.P. 37 sanctions give yet another reason for counsel to 
identify the documents they intend to rely upon, as well as the witnesses 
likely to have discoverable information, early on in litigation, in 
compliance with F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1).144  Should a party fail to disclose 
copies, or even a description by category and location, of electronically 
stored information, there is a palpable risk that the court will exclude such 
                                                            
140  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
 
141  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(E). 
 
142 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106-07 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
 
144 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
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ESI when it is submitted in support of a motion or trial.145  A certification 
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(g) made without the required diligence and 
investigation—i.e., a certification that all documents demanded have been 
disclosed when, in fact, certain documents have not been produced—may 
also subject counsel to sanctions.146  
 
[42] Disclosure can become a nettlesome issue for a proponent of non-
U.S. ESI because of the collision between U.S. discovery rules and non-
U.S. privacy and data protection laws.147  A party that declines to provide 
certain information during discovery on the grounds that doing so would 
violate the laws of the host country and, perhaps, subject the litigant to 
civil or criminal proceedings, may well find itself precluded from offering 
like kind evidence at trial, and may be subject to other sanctions as well.148  
In Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping, the government of 
Spain propounded discovery requests but resisted discovery demands 
served upon it on the ground that compliance would violate Spanish 
privacy law. 149  The court ordered the Spanish government to comply with 
the discovery demands, holding that Spain, which chose a U.S. venue for 
its suit, was bound to comply with U.S. discovery rules.150   
                                                            
145 See, e.g., Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Ariz. 2009) 
(prohibiting use of materials that were improperly disclosed under F.R.C.P. 
26(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Alaska 
2005). 
 
146 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
 
147 See Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81415, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006). 
 
148 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A)-(C) (providing that, if a party fails to disclose information 
“the party is not allowed to use that information… at a trial, unless the failure was 
substantially justified or is harmless,” and the party may also be subject to other 
sanctions). 
 
149 See Reino De Espana, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41498, at *3-4. 
 
150 See id. at *26.  Ultimately, Spain narrowly escaped an adverse inference charge, even 
though the court found it negligently failed to implement a timely litigation hold, because 
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[43] The national oil company of Venezuela found itself in a similar 
situation in Lynodell-Citgo Refining P.P. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, 
S.A.151  The defendant was served with a discovery demand for minutes of 
its board of directors.152  Compliance with the demand, which would have 
of necessity divulged the identity of the directors and placed them at a 
particular location on a certain date, would have violated Venezuela’s 
Special Law Against Information Systems Crimes and subjected the 
defendant to potential criminal prosecution.153  Because the defendant 
declined to comply with a court order directing provision of the minutes, 
the court sanctioned the defendant with an adverse inference jury 
instruction.154  While not specifically addressed in the decision, there is 
little doubt that Petroleos de Venezuela, having raised an objection to 
producing the minutes because of the requirements of local law, would 
have been precluded from offering similar evidence at trial.155  Counsel, 
then, should carefully weigh its position and the relative risks when 
considering whether to bring applications to quash subpoenas or motions 
for Protective Orders on the basis of local privacy or data protection laws.  
                                                                                                                                                    
pplaintiff could not demonstrate that the missing evidence was relevant.  See id. at *21-
24.  But cf. IO Group Inc. v. GLBT LTD., No. C 10 1282 MMC (DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120815, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (granting pplaintiff’s motion for an 
adverse inference charge against ddefendant). 
    
151 See Lyondell-Citgo Refining, LP v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A., No. 02 Civ. 
0795(CBM), 2005 WL 356808, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2005). 
 
152 Id. 
 
153 See id.  
 
154 See id. at *1-2, 4.  An adverse inference jury instruction advises the jury that the 
producing party had a legal duty to produce the subject information but did not do so, and 
that the jury may presume, though it is not required to do so, that the subject information 
would have been adverse to the position of the jury at trial.  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 
L.L.C., 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
 
155 Cf. Reino De Espana, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41498, at *26; notes 149-50 and 
accompanying text. 
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A long view toward trial is often advisable in formulating discovery 
strategy. 
 
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF NON-U.S. ESI IN MOTION PRACTICE 
 
[44] The rules that govern the admission of documentary evidence at 
trial apply with equal force to dispositive and in limine motions that 
require support by proof in admissible form; however, recent changes in 
procedural rules have altered the logistics and burdens for demonstrating 
admissibility of supporting documents for such motions.156 
 
[45] F.R.C.P. 56 governs summary judgment practice.157  Until very 
recently, the rule clearly stated that unauthenticated documents may not be 
considered on a motion for summary judgment.158  Under F.R.C.P. 56, 
parties were required to present documentary proof in admissible form in 
support of summary judgment papers.159  Accordingly, counsel was 
essentially required to lay the foundation for every piece of documentary 
evidence appended to their summary judgment motions.  Failure to 
comply with this requirement would preclude the court from considering 
the evidence, sometimes resulting in summary judgment decisions in 
which the judiciary would lambast counsel for foundational omissions.160  
Bowers v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia provides a 
cautionary tale as the evidence takes on the additional layer of complexity, 
such as those encountered with ESI from other countries. 161  In Bowers, 
                                                            
156 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (Supp. IV 2010).  
 
157 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56.   
 
158 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (Supp. III 2009). 
 
159 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
 
160 See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.   
 
161 Bowers v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, No. 3:06cv00041, 2007 WL 
2963818, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 9, 2007); accord Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 369-70. 
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an employment matter alleging improper termination, counsel appended 
600 pages of e-mails and website printouts.162  Her foundation for 
authentication comprised mostly counsel’s own affidavit averring the 
information’s authenticity because “the e-mails had been obtained from 
the defendants during the course of discovery and the web pages were 
taken from ‘published’ internet web sites.”163  The court, in granting the 
defendants’ motion for sanctions pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(g), excoriated 
counsel as follows: 
 
[T]he submission by plaintiff’s counsel of . . . more than 
fifty unauthenticated copies of e-mails convincingly 
demonstrates both a recklessness and an absence of 
preparation on the part of plaintiff’s counsel. Equally so, 
her resort to use of her own affidavit in a misguided quick-
and-easy attempt to fix significant evidentiary deficiencies, 
demonstrates a recklessness in preparation and a failure to 
exercise legal judgment abject.164 
 
[46] In 2010, the Supreme Court introduced a new subdivision of 
F.R.C.P. 56, Subdivision (c), which “establishes a common procedure for 
several aspects of summary-judgment motions . . . .” 165  Subdivision (c), 
entitled “Procedures,” provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: 
(A)  citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 
including depositions, documents, electronically stored 
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 
                                                            
162 Bowers, 2007 WL 2963818, at *1. 
 
163 Id. at *2. 
 
164 Id. at *7. 
 
165 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) advisory committee’s notes (Supp. IV 2010).  
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(including those made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 
. . . 
(2)  A party may object that the material cited to support 
or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would 
be admissible in evidence.166 
 
[47] Subdivision (c)(2) sets out a new procedure for submitting 
documentary proof in support of summary judgment motions.167  The 
advisory committee summarized this procedure as follows: 
 
[A] party may object that material cited to support or 
dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be 
admissible in evidence. The objection functions much as an 
objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The 
burden is on the proponent to show that the material is 
admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form 
that is anticipated. There is no need to make a separate 
motion to strike. If the case goes to trial, failure to 
challenge admissibility at the summary-judgment stage 
does not forfeit the right to challenge admissibility at 
trial.168 
 
                                                            
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added).  
 
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).  In addition to motions for summary 
judgment, the admissibility issue may arise as early as pre-answer motion practice.  
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(d): “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated 
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”  FED. R. CIV. P 
12(d).  
 
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c)(2) committee notes on rules (Supp. IV 2010).  
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[48] Ostensibly, Subdivision (c) may obviate the need for counsel to 
provide the basis for a document’s admissibility.  The language is 
ambiguous, and with the exception of Foreword Magazine v. Overdrive, 
the courts have yet to weigh in on whether unchallenged evidence, for 
which counsel has laid no foundation, will be considered on summary 
judgment. 169  Indeed, the new F.R.C.P. 56(c) creates more questions than 
it answers.  For example, does the new rule suggest that only after 
objection does the burden shift to the proponent to demonstrate 
admissibility?170  For this reason alone, the wording of the subdivision 
should give counsel pause because it does not speak on whether a court 
may exclude evidence on a sua sponte basis, especially in light of case law 
under the former F.R.C.P. 56, which, by and large, holds that “[a] trial 
court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.”171  One must question whether this holding is 
consistent with the procedure articulated in the new subdivision and, if so, 
how.   
 
[49] In Foreword Magazine, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Michigan explained that the new subdivision had replaced 
former F.R.C.P. 56(2), which had unequivocally mandated authentication 
for documents presented in summary judgment motions.172  But, the court 
warned, as a result of the 2010 amendments to F.R.C.P. 56, parties must 
                                                            
169 Foreword Magazine, Inc. v. Overdrive, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1144, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 125373, at *3-6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2011) (“Thus, the amendment replaces a 
clear, bright-line rule (‘all documents must be authenticated’) with a multi-step process 
by which a proponent may submit evidence, subject to objection by the opponent and an 
opportunity for the proponent to either authenticate the document or propose a method to 
doing so at trial.”). 
 
170 See 11 JAMES WM. ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.91[7] (3d ed. 2011) (“If 
a party fails to object to the inadmissibility of evidence submitted by its opponent in the 
summary judgment proceedings, the court may consider the evidence.”). 
  
171 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
172 See Foreword Magazine, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125373, at *3-4. 
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not disregard the prevailing authorities but, in fact, should read them very 
carefully.173  The Foreword Magazine court found that the “unequivocal 
requirement” of authentication for documents submitted in support of 
summary judgment papers was effectively eliminated.174  According to the 
Foreword Magazine court, the opponent must now object to the 
admissibility of evidence, demonstrating a paradigm shift from objection 
that the item “has not” been submitted in admissible form to objection that 
it “cannot” be.175  The court interpreted the comments to the 2010 
amendments to mean that “the drafters intended to make summary 
judgment practice conform to procedure at trial.”176 
 
[50] Foreword Magazine is one of very few published decisions 
interpreting the significance of the new F.R.C.P. 56(c); in contrast, some 
other decisions cite to earlier versions of the statute, indicating that some 
litigators and judiciary may rely on the old rule in support of their briefs 
and decisions.177  This presents a conundrum for practitioners making 
dispositive motions.  If they submit materials in support of their summary 
judgment motion without laying any evidentiary foundation whatsoever, 
in reliance on the new F.R.C.P. 56(c), will they be penalized for the 
omission as though the old rule were still in effect?  This risk may be 
heightened when citing to foreign ESI in support of or opposition to 
dispositive motions, as authenticity issues may loom large in the mind of 
the judge considering the motion.  In this regard, it is helpful to recall that 
the court, even if it is well aware of the new procedure, may exclude the 
                                                            
173 Id. at *4.  
 
174 Id. 
 
175 Id. at *5. 
 
176 Id. 
 
177 See, e.g., Arroyo-Perez v. Demir Grp. Int’l, 762 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376 (Dist. P.R. 
2011). 
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evidence sua sponte or, as the court stated in Foreword, hold the 
proponent of the evidence to trial standards of authentication.178 
 
[51] Thus, the practitioner who plans to rely on Subdivision (c) by 
appending ESI proof to a dispositive motion without providing the 
evidentiary basis for its admissibility would be well advised to assess the 
risk of exclusion or disregard of the evidence by the court. To make this 
assessment, counsel should be knowledgeable about local rules,179 any 
prior decisions of the motion court with regard to the new procedure, and 
how the court has considered ESI proof generally as well as ESI from 
outside the U.S. 
 
[52] An opposing party’s level of cooperation may also influence 
counsel’s course of action.  For example, in the case of a foreign party 
unfamiliar with U.S. litigation, from a jurisdiction in which privacy and/or 
data protection laws may give such party pause when it comes to fully 
complying with the discovery process, any delay or impairment of 
counsel’s ability to ascertain all the information necessary to overcoming 
evidentiary hurdles may make submitting documents in accordance with 
Subdivision (c)’s new procedure very attractive, provided the court 
follows the logic articulated in the Foreword decision.  The case arguably 
affords counsel the opportunity to seek the disposition of a matter without 
                                                            
178 See Foreward Magazine, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125373, at *5. 
 
179 Some U.S. District Court local rules mirror the new F.R.C.P. subdivision.  See, e.g., 
U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF OR. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 56-1(b) (2011), available at 
http://www.ord.uscourts.gov/en/local-rules-of-civil-procedure/lr-56-summary-judgment.  
Others resemble the old version of F.R.C.P. 56.  See, e.g., LOCAL RULES OF THE U.S. 
DIST. COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTS. OF NEW YORK, LOCAL RULE 
56.1 (2011), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/docs/localrules.pdf; see also 
LOCAL RULES OF THE U.S. DIST. COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTS. OF 
NEW YORK, LOCAL RULE 56.1, advisory committee’s note (2011), available at 
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/docs/localrules.pdf (“the Committee believes that the 
language adopted in 2004 sets forth these requirements clearly, and does not recommend 
any changes in that language.”). 
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being forced to submit evidence in admissible form when, under the 
circumstances, such evidence is not easily authenticated. 
   
[53] The pretrial discovery phase of litigation also offers other 
opportunities to tackle thorny evidentiary issues involving foreign ESI.  
Under F.R.C.P. 36, for example, a party may request that his or her 
adversary admit to the “genuineness of a document,”180 which may be of 
mutual benefit in matters where both parties are multinational entities.  
Litigants should raise these issues, and others regarding foreign ESI 
authentication issues, at the earliest opportunities, including discovery 
conferences pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(f) and 16.181 
 
[54] Motions in limine present another key opportunity to address the 
exclusion or admission of evidence in advance of trial.  The purpose of a 
motion in limine is typically to limit or exclude certain evidence or 
testimony, but it may also be used by a proponent seeking to admit 
evidence.182  The motion is generally made at the commencement of 
trial,183 and the judge hears it outside the presence of the jury.  Motions in 
limine can be an important tool for trial counsel and can accordingly 
reduce the number of disruptions (e.g., side-bar conferences and 
objections) during trial.184  More important, a motion in limine permits the 
court to rule on the relevance and admissibility of evidence before counsel 
                                                            
180 FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3) (“A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being 
served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written 
answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.”).   
 
181 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 
182 See FED. R. EVID. 104; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (9th ed. 2009).  
 
183 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
184 See Bastilla v. The Village of Cahokia, No. 06-CV-0150-MJR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1939, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) (citing Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 
1996)) (explaining that motions in limine can speed up the trial process by avoiding 
interruptions and lengthy arguments at trial).  
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offers it at trial, thus reducing time spent in hearings outside the presence 
of the jury.185  
 
[55] In the case of foreign ESI, a motion in limine hearing may serve as 
an opportunity for counsel to fully educate the court on the source, 
creation, and maintenance of the proffered data or documents.186  This, in 
turn, may well trigger the judge to initiate a F.R.E. 104(a) examination of 
the evidence.187  F.R.E. 104(a) provides that: “the court must decide any 
preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege 
exists, or evidence is admissible.”188  Generally, the proponent will carry 
the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of evidence on preliminary 
questions concerning admissibility.189  Conversely, under F.R.E. 104(b), 
the court does not employ the same standard as under F.R.E. 104(a) when 
                                                            
185 See id.  Hearings on admissibility during state court trials, known as voir dire, are 
conducted outside the hearing of the jury. 
 
186 See generally 21 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5037.10 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that 
motions in limine “[allow] the parties to more thoroughly brief the law and the court to 
consider the arguments more thoroughly than would be possible in the heat of trial”); G. 
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its 
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 957 (1996) (explaining that early 104(a) rulings 
help to educate judges about special vocabulary before evidence begins to come in). 
 
187 See Bastilla, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1939 at *1-2 (both parties’ motions in limine 
caused the judge to conduct F.R.E. 104 analysis).  Also note that, under F.R.E. 104(c), 
there is no guarantee that once trial is underway, a hearing on admissibility will be 
conducted outside the presence of the jury, unless the court is ruling on the admissibility 
of a confession; the interests of justice require it; or it is at the request of a witness, and 
that witness is the accused.  FED. R. EVID. 104(c).  
 
188 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that a court ruling on the admissibility of evidence is 
“not bound by the rules of evidence except those on privilege”).   
 
189 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.10 (1993); 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 
511 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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deciding questions of conditional relevancy.190  Instead, the standard is 
effectively a prima facie standard, as the trial court only determines 
whether the proponent presented sufficient evidence to support a finding 
of the fulfillment of the condition.191  The distinction, in practice, is 
subtle.192   
 
[56] Discovery conferences pursuant to F.R.C.P. 16, and other pre-trial 
conferences, provide additional opportunities to preliminarily address 
admissibility.193  For example, F.R.C.P. 16(c)(2) not only permits counsel 
to request that the adversary stipulate to the authenticity of documents, 
including ESI, but also allows the court the chance to assess the 
evidentiary issues and take appropriate action to address any such 
applications.194  Thus, an opposing counsel’s refusal of the request could 
prompt a F.R.E. 104(a) examination of the foundational grounds for the 
document’s admissibility, at which time, depending on the evidentiary 
rules at issue, counsel could make a prima facie showing of authenticity to 
the court.195  
                                                            
190 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact 
exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. 
The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced 
later.”). 
 
191 Id.  
 
192 See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. L.E. Myers Co. Grp., 937 F. Supp. 
276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (illustrating that when the court “lacks the necessary 
specificity with respect to the evidence to be excluded,” the motion can be denied).  
Moreover, the court may in its discretion alter an in limine ruling at trial.   Luce v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984). 
 
193 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16.  
 
194 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2). 
 
195 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (authorizing the court to determine preliminary admissibility 
matters including whether the proponent of evidence has laid down a sufficient 
foundation, from which the jury could find the evidence is authentic). 
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V. AUTHENTICATION OF SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF ESI 
ENCOUNTERED IN CROSS BORDER MATTERS 
 
[57] Historically, as technological innovations have given rise to new 
types of evidence, judges have initially met such offerings with a 
significant level of skepticism, especially with regard to evidence 
collected from the Internet.196  However, the approach of U.S. courts 
toward authenticating electronic evidence has evolved.  Some courts still 
may suggest that “the complex nature of computer storage calls for a more 
comprehensive foundation,”197 but others hold that discovery of new types 
of ESI “requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel 
context.”198  While ESI authentication occurs in the same manner as any 
other type of evidence, different forms of ESI have distinct characteristics 
and qualities that impact admissibility.  In a world where paper documents 
compare to electronic information as the horse and buggy compares to the 
                                                            
196 See St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. 
Tex. 1999).  In holding the plaintiff’s proffered data from the US Coast Guard’s online 
vessel database insufficient, U.S. District Judge Samuel Kent stated “[w]hile some look 
to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the Court continues to warily 
and wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and 
misinformation.”  Id.  Judge Kent went on to state:  
 
[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet.  No web-site is monitored 
for accuracy and nothing contained therein is under oath or even 
subject to independent verification absent underlying documentation.  
Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the 
content on any web-site from any location at any time.  For these 
reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost 
nothing, even under the most liberal interpretation of the hearsay 
exception rules. . . .  
 
Id. 
 
197 United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 
198 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (in reference to social networking sites). 
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automobile and where online interaction is the daily norm, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to explicitly cover the 
discovery of “electronically stored information,”199 and courts have begun 
to apply the rules of admissibility to the realities of the Digital Age.  This 
section will address the issues associated with the admissibility of types of 
ESI frequently encountered during disputes between multinational entities, 
namely e-mails, text messages, instant messages, electronic chat logs, web 
pages, archived Internet content, social media, Internet tracking 
information, and log files. 
 
A. E-mail 
 
[58] As attractive markets abroad entice U.S. companies to expand 
overseas and the Internet continues to erode traditional barriers between 
foreign companies and U.S. consumers, more subsidiaries and affiliates of 
U.S. companies and foreign companies doing business in the U.S. will 
find themselves subject to the long arm of U.S. jurisdiction.200  E-mail 
serves as a primary bridge to facilitate the communication that makes this 
global interconnectivity possible.201  The more we e-mail, the more e-mail 
will be potentially relevant to U.S. legal proceedings. 
 
[59] When offering e-mail into evidence, counsel must show that the 
information is self-authenticating under F.R.E. 902202 or meet the 
                                                            
199 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 
200 See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1068 (3d ed.) (discussing how long-arm statutes have expanded over 
time to allow for jurisdiction over foreign companies performing significant business in 
the United States, either at the state or national level).  
 
201 See SEDONA FRAMEWORK, supra note 1 at 1. 
 
202 Courts most often deem e-mail evidence to be self-authenticating under FED. R. EVID. 
902(7) (Trade Inscriptions and the Like), and FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (Certified Domestic 
Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity). 
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standards for authentication under F.R.E. 901.203  Where a proponent 
makes no attempt to authenticate e-mail evidence by offering any 
explanation as to its origin, the court will likely rule that the document is 
unauthenticated and thus inadmissible.204  As with any other evidence, 
counsel must take steps to show that the e-mail is what it purports to be.  
Testimony from one with personal knowledge of the e-mail in question is 
a widely accepted method for showing an e-mail’s authenticity.205  
Furthermore, many courts have held that live testimony of a witness with 
personal knowledge may not be necessary if an affidavit of such a witness, 
combined with non-hearsay evidence of identifying characteristics (such 
as the URL address, date of the exchange, print date, profile names of the 
messengers, identity of the sender and recipient, etc.), is available to show 
authenticity: 
 
The lower [federal] courts generally hold that an affidavit 
of a witness, when viewed in combination with 
circumstantial indicia of authenticity (such as the existence 
of the URL, date of printing, or other identifying 
                                                            
203 See FED. R. EVID. 901; United States v. Safavian,  435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40-41 
(discussing how e-mail may be authenticated under the Federal Rules of Evidence).  It is 
important to note that in many courts, parties must address authentications and other 
admissibility issues with regards to each individual e-mail comprising a chain or thread.  
See, e.g., New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233, 2002 WL 649951 at *5 
(D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the individual e-mail messages did not overcome the hearsay 
requirements to be admitted). 
 
204 See Boyd v. Toyobo Am., Inc. (In re Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.), 434 B.R. 
502, 505 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that e-mail was not properly authenticated 
where it bore no indicia of authenticity and the e-mail was an internal communication 
between employees of a non-party company, and the proponent’s witness was not an 
employee of that company, was not listed as a recipient of the e-mail, and testified that he 
had never seen the e-mail). 
 
205 See Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 545 (D. Md. 2007).   
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information) would support a reasonable juror in the belief 
that the documents are what the proponent says they are.206  
 
[60] Despite the fact that e-mails present numerous metadata fields and 
other characteristics that can be used as indicia of authenticity, F.R.E. 901 
sets a relatively low bar for clearing the authenticity hurdle since the 
proponent must only “produce evidence to support a finding that the item 
is what the proponent claims.”207  In other words, judges may leave 
questions of origin, business practices, etc. to the jury to attach such 
importance as they deem appropriate.  Furthermore, the court need not 
make a determination that the evidence is what the proponent claims, 
rather, it should determine whether there is evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to make that determination.208  Once meeting this 
“minimal authentication requirement,” arguments concerning the accuracy 
of the printouts go only to weight, not admissibility.209  
 
[61] In the case of e-mail collected from foreign sources, obtaining 
evidence supporting authenticity in the form of live testimony from the 
sender or recipient of an e-mail, or the controller of a server where the e-
                                                            
206 Foreword Magazine v. OverDrive, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1144, 2011 WL 5169384 at *3 
(W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 
207 FED. R. EVID. 901(a).   
 
208 See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (“The threshold for the Court’s determination of 
authenticity is not high… The Court need not find that the evidence is necessarily what 
the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately 
might do so.” (citations omitted)).  
 
209 See United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001).  Computer 
printouts of records maintained by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation were deemed 
authenticated through testimony by a government witness that the printouts reflected the 
Bureau’s record of information about the ddefendant’s business.  Id.  The court went on 
to note that such public records can be authenticated by showing custody and nothing 
more.  Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 901, advisory committee notes, 1972 Proposed Rules). 
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mail is held, may not be possible or practical.210  For example, if the 
witness is in a foreign country, he or she may be beyond subpoena power, 
or may not be willing to travel to the U.S.  If so, is the witness willing to 
provide oral testimony, an affidavit, sworn declaration, or unsworn 
declaration as permitted by 28 U.S.C. §1746?  It may be that the 
applicable laws of the foreign country (such as blocking statutes that 
proscribe testimony or evidence provided for a foreign judicial 
proceeding),211 company culture, or local customs may preclude a witness 
from testifying in the litigation.212 
 
[62] If authenticating direct testimony, whether oral or written, should 
prove impractical, and assuming that such e-mails are not self-
authenticating under F.R.E. 902 or other provisions, counsel must look to 
other modes of authentication through more circumstantial evidence such 
as (i) expert testimony, (ii) comparison of the e-mail to another 
communication that has already been authenticated, (iii) distinctive 
characteristics and other circumstances indicating reliability, or (iv) some 
other method sufficient to clear the authenticity hurdle.213  It behooves 
counsel to gather all identifying and circumstantial evidence surrounding 
                                                            
210 See generally SEDONA FRAMEWORK, supra note 2 at 10 (giving an example of how the 
location of a server can hinder the discovery process and how the law must be adopted to 
deal with such issues). 
 
211 See id. at 18.  
 
212 Cf. Karen McVeigh and Amelia Hill, Bill Limiting Sharia Law is Motivated by 
‘Concern for Muslim Women,’ THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 8, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/law/2011/jun/08/sharia-bill-lords-muslim-women (The practice under Sharia law of 
ascribing testimony from a female witness half the weight of that from a man, for 
example, could ultimately have some impact on gathering testimony from such a witness 
for use in a U.S. Court.).   
 
213 See U.S. Info. Sys. Inc. v. Int’l Bhd., No. 00 Civ 4763 RMB JCF, 2006 WL 2136249 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006) (highlighting that under some circumstances, the mere fact 
that documents were produced pursuant to discovery or a subpoena is sufficient for 
authentication).  
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e-mail early in the litigation to help support authenticity in the context of 
foreign e-mail.  Such evidence may include descriptions of 
contemporaneous events and opinions, references to certain circumstances 
specifically known by the sender, a time stamp prior to litigation,214 
certain unique uses of language, or circumstantial evidence associated 
with whether e-mail services are provided through an ISP, an employer, or 
via a web-based service (i.e., web-based services will have a unique URL 
that can go towards authentication; evidence of the authentication and 
access controls used to secure an employer-provided e-mail system may 
be used to address concerns regarding hacking or fraudulent use).215 
 
B.  Text Messages, Instant Messages, and  
Electronic Chat Logs 
 
[63] Text messages, instant messages, and electronic chat logs present 
the same types of challenges to authenticity as e-mail; namely that anyone 
with access to the sending device could feasibly author a particular 
message and that—as with e-mail—“while an electronic message can be 
traced to a particular computer, it can rarely be connected to a specific 
author with any certainty.”216  However, counsel can overcome these 
challenges, and the purported text, instant message or electronic chat log 
can be authenticated in the same manner as any other document: through 
the introduction of evidence that the text, instant message or chat log is 
what the proponent says.217  This authenticating evidence can take the 
                                                            
214 See id. at *6. 
 
215 See generally Lorraine 241 F.R.D. at 551-52 (discussing how employer company e-
mail can help identify the source of the e-mail).  
 
216 In re F.P., 878 A.2d 92, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (quoting appellant’s argument). 
 
217 Id. at 96 (“We see no justification for constructing unique rules for admissibility of 
electronic communications such as instant messages; they are to be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis as any other document to determine whether or not there has been 
an adequate foundational showing of their relevance and authenticity.”). 
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form of testimony from a witness who participated in the 
communication,218 expert testimony or comparison with a previously 
authenticated message, or evidence of distinctive characteristics and 
corroborating circumstances.  Counsel must remain cognizant, though, of 
language translation issues, as discussed supra.  
 
[64] The testimony of any participant in the conversation can 
authenticate a text, message, or chat log, thereby evening the playing field 
for practitioners who may not be able to access foreign participants’ live 
testimony.  Thus, a text message can be authenticated even in situations 
where the witness did not print out or save the message219 or there is no 
testimony from an Internet Service Provider or other expert.220    
 
     
                                                            
218 See United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a sex 
crimes conviction by finding that chat log transcripts were properly authenticated through 
testimony from a woman posing as a minor child who participated in online chats with 
the ddefendant, and that the transcripts fully and fairly reproduced the chats between her 
and the ddefendant).  The Barlow Court went on to note that the issue of authenticating 
online chat log transcripts through testimony of the other participant had been addressed 
previously.  But see United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding 
sufficient authentication from testimony by a federal agent and a federal informant who 
engaged in the chat in question); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 629, 630-31 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding the testimony of another chat room user that he recorded the chats and 
printed them out, and that the printouts appeared to accurately represent the chats, was 
sufficient to establish prima facie showing of authenticity); United States v. Simpson, 152 
F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a combination of identifying information 
given by the user in the chat and corroborating evidence found in defendant's home near 
his computer was sufficient to authenticate the chat log). 
 
219 People v. Pierre, 41 A.D.3d 290, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that an instant 
message was properly authenticated through testimony from defendant’s close friend that 
the screen name associated with the message was the defendant’s, that the witness sent a 
message to that screen name and received a reply, and that the content of the message 
would have only made sense if it was sent by defendant).    
 
220 In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94-95. 
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C.  Website Content and Archived Web Pages 
 
[65] The judiciary has typically viewed the Internet—arguably the most 
revolutionary communications development of modern times and giving 
rise to an unprecedented level of global interaction—in a dubious light due 
to its public access and the ease by which content can be manipulated, 
even prompting one court to opine that “any evidence procured off the 
Internet is adequate for almost nothing.”221  At first glance, this skepticism 
seems valid when one looks at examples such as Wikipedia.com, a multi-
lingual, free encyclopedia with the tag line “the free encyclopedia that 
anyone can edit.”222  However, Wikipedia serves as an excellent 
microcosm for the lack of uniformity with which the judiciary approaches 
the Internet in general.  At least one state court has specifically called 
Wikipedia “a malleable source of information [that] is inherently 
unreliable,”223 but other courts at the federal level have been skeptics of 
this position.224  Wikipedia does not make any guarantee of validity with 
                                                            
221 St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999); 
see supra note 196. 
 
222 WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 
223 Palisades Collection, L.L.C. v. Graubard, No. A-1338-07T3, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1025, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 17, 2009) (reversing the trial court’s 
decision after finding that the court erred in admitting a print out from Wikipedia and 
taking judicial notice of content from the Wikipedia page).  In support of its holding, the 
court stated that the “trial court's acceptance of Wikipedia was also contrary to the 
principle that judicial notice must be based upon ‘sources whose accuracy cannot be 
reasonably questioned.’”  Id.    
 
224 E.g. Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing to 
Wikipedia for background information on “Media Buying”); Alfa Corp. v. OAO Alfa 
Bank, 475 F. Supp. 2d 357, 361-62, No. 04 Cv 8968 (KMW) (JCF), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12771, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2007) (rejecting the argument that expert 
testimony should be excluded because the expert relied, in part, on a Wikipedia page); 
see also Chapman v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency, No. C01-02305 CRB, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18012, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2002) (finding that a computer printout of 
page from U.S. Postal Service Web site was sufficiently reliable to constitute an 
admissible public record). 
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regard to content and disclaims any liability, telling users to post and 
utilize information at their own risk.225  In this sense, Wikipedia reflects a 
concern highlighted by Judge Grimm, that a website may display 
information not posted by or officially endorsed by the site owner.226 
 
[66] As with all electronic evidence, the court, in authenticating a web 
page, must find enough support that would “warrant a reasonable person 
in determining that the evidence is what it purports to be,”227 and can do 
so through witness testimony, expert opinion, public records evidence 
supporting F.R.E. 901(7), process or system evidence supporting F.R.E. 
901(9), or evidence deemed to be self-authenticating as an official 
publication under F.R.E. 902(5).  In Lorraine, Judge Grimm suggests 
additional factors that counsel should consider when authenticating 
content from web pages, including length of time that the data was on the 
site and whether the owner of the data has republished it elsewhere.228 
 
[67] The Internet gives counsel involved in cross-border matters a 
unique ability to gather information otherwise difficult to retrieve.  
Information about foreign business, individuals, government entities, and 
other organizations is often readily available from any U.S.-based office 
with an Internet browser.229  While some courts have deemed website 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
225 Wikipedia: General Disclaimer, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:General_disclaimer (“…all information read here 
is without any implied warranty of fitness for any purpose or use whatsoever.”). 
 
226 Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007).  
 
227 United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158, No. 1:09-cr-00024-JAW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4721, at *11 (D. Me. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing United States v. Holmquist, 
36 F.3d 154, 167 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
 
228 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 555-56 (internal citations omitted). 
 
229 See How to Track Down Anyone Online, LIFE HACKER, 
http://lifehacker.com/329033/how-to-track-down-anyone-online (last visited Feb. 10, 
2012) (explaining how Internet users can easily search for people using the various 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3 
 56 
content authenticated simply because the offered printout contains the 
website URL and the date of printing,230 counsel should use caution in 
relying on this method in cross-border matters.  Instead counsel should 
“present evidence from a witness with personal knowledge of the website . 
. . stating that the printout accurately reflects the content of the website 
and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was 
made.”231  The individual performing the actual search and review, if 
available, may serve as an ideal source of testimony.  Counsel can help 
support authentication by obtaining the testimony of an expert well-versed 
in the use of hash values,232 who can speak the language displayed on the 
target website, collect web postings and other such content, and provide 
                                                                                                                                                    
services and search engines available online); LEXISNEXIS INFO PRO, 
http://law.lexisnexis.com/infopro/zimmermans/disp.aspx?z=1313 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2012) (listing online resources for finding information about companies); Tax 
Information for Government Entities, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/govt/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2012) (providing links to tax information about federal, state, and local 
government agencies). 
 
230 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 03-
1605, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20753, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004). 
 
231 Toytrackerz, LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74484, at 
*24 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2009); see also Nightlight Sys., Inc. v. Nitelites Franchise Sys., 
Inc., No. 1:04-CV-2112-CAP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95538,  at *16 (N.D. Ga. May 
11, 2007) (“In addition to a witness with personal knowledge of the web page at issue, 
to authenticate a printout from a web page, the proponent must present evidence from 
a percipient witness stating that the printout accurately reflects the content of the page 
and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was made.”). 
 
232 As a practical strategy to support authentication, counsel should use hash values 
whenever possible.  A hash is defined as “a mathematical algorithm that represents a 
unique value for a given set of data, similar to a digital fingerprint.”  THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 25 (Sherry B. 
Harris ed., 3rd ed. 2010), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm? 
did=TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf; see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547 (“Hash values can be 
inserted into original electronic documents when they are created to provide them with 
distinctive characteristics that will permit their authentication under Rule 901(b)(4).”). 
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testimony or prepare an affidavit or declaration describing how and when 
these efforts were performed. 
 
[68] U.S. Courts have differed in the level of inquiry used to 
authenticate evidence collected from the Internet Archive.233  In Telewizja 
Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois held that the defendant adequately 
authenticated printouts from the Internet Archive by submitting a 
declaration from a representative of the Internet Archive, who stated that 
the copies retrieved came from the website as it appeared on the dates in 
question.234  The court went on to note that the party opposing the 
printouts presented no evidence of the Internet Archive’s unreliability or 
that the exhibits themselves were untrustworthy.235 
 
[69] In granting a Canadian defendant’s motion to strike various 
printouts from the Wayback Machine,236 the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York relied, in part, on the absence of the type of 
personal knowledge present in Telewizja.  The court noted that the 
plaintiff lacked personal knowledge about how the web content appeared 
at the earlier time and did not proffer testimony or sworn statements from 
                                                            
233 See generally Deborah R. Eltgroth, Best Evidence and the Wayback Machine: Toward 
a Workable Authentication Standard for Archived Internet Evidence, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 182 (2009) (discussing differing judicial opinions and orders that have commented 
on the admissibility of Internet Archive evidence). 
 
234 Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293, 2004 WL 
2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004). 
 
235 Id. 
 
236 The Wayback Machine is a free service offered by the Internet Archive, a non-profit 
organization formed for the purpose of provided access to “historical collections that 
exist in digital format.”  About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE, 
http://www.archive.org/about/about.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).  The Wayback 
Machine allows users to search for and retrieve archived versions of web sites.  The 
Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php#The_ 
Wayback_Machine (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
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any employees from the companies hosting the sites from which the pages 
were printed.237  Taken together, these two opinions show the importance 
of having an appropriately qualified person perform the archive collection, 
consider any translation issues, and provide oral or written testimony as to 
the archived copies’ appearance in comparison to the website as it 
appeared at the time in question.238 
 
D.  Social Media 
 
[70] Social media and social networking sites have facilitated an 
unprecedented amount of interconnectivity among citizens from various 
nations.239  On Facebook alone, for example, there are more than 800 
million active users; of those users, approximately 80% of them live 
outside the U.S.240  The micro-blogging site Twitter is very popular all 
over the world, with some statistics indicating that users across the world 
                                                            
237 Novak v. Tucows, Inc., No. 06CV1909(JFB)(ARL), 2007 WL 922306, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007). 
 
238 As a practical consideration, counsel should also be aware of the technological 
limitations of collecting archived web site content, including the fact that an archived 
page may not include all the content as it originally appeared since content may have 
since been deleted, may require communication with another host for certain content, or 
may contain broken or re-directed links.  When dealing with evidence collected from the 
Internet Archive, counsel would be wise to consider a forensic or other expert that can 
provide testimony regarding these issues.  
 
239 See About - Twitter, http://twitter.com/about#about (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) 
(indicating that Twitter is “used by people in nearly every country in the world”); 
Facebook Newsroom - Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default. 
aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (highlighting that “Facebook’s mission 
is to make the world more open and connected.”). 
 
240 Facebook Newsroom - Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/defa 
ult.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).  
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send over 1 billion “tweets” each week.241  Although Facebook and 
Twitter are the poster children for the explosion in the use of online social 
networks, millions of users subscribe to a multitude of different social 
media sites.242  The international market for social media is extremely 
robust, with many local sites dominating larger social media outlets, like 
Facebook, in their respective regions and offering competitive alternatives 
to U.S.-based social media and networking sites.243  For example, StudiVZ 
is the largest social network in Germany;244 Xing is a competitor to 
LinkedIn that is popular in Spain, France, and Italy;245 and in China, 
where Facebook is blocked by government censors, networks like QZone, 
RenRen, and Pengyou compete for users.246 
 
[71] A few years ago, social media and networking sites would not have 
registered on the average practitioner’s radar.247  However, potential 
                                                            
241 Anna Gervai, Twitter Statistics - Updated stats for 2011, MARKETING GUM, 
http://www.marketinggum.com/twitter-statistics-2011-updated-stats (last visited Feb. 4, 
2012).     
 
242 See Facebook Newsroom - Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/c 
ontent/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (highlighting that, on 
Facebook alone, more than 50% of users log on to the site every day). 
 
243 See Sarov Jain, 40 Most Popular Social Networking Sites of the World, 
SOCIALMEDIATODAY, http://socialmediatoday.com/soravjain/195917/40-most-popular-
social-networking-sites-world (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).  
 
244 Id. 
 
245 Id. 
 
246 Kai Lukoff, Coming Soon: Tencent’s “International” Social Network, TECHRICE, 
http://techrice.com/2011/01/17/coming-soon-tencents-international-social-network/ (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012).  
 
247 See Evan E. North, Comment, Facebook Isn't Your Space Anymore: Discovery of 
Social Networking Websites, 58 KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (2010). 
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evidence from such sites must be preserved if relevant,248 and at least one 
U.S. Court has now held that counsel’s failure to investigate and introduce 
evidence from such social networking sites could constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.249  Social media falls within the purview of F.R.C.P. 
26 and it, too, must jump through the hoops of admissibility.250  The 
unique challenges that practitioners face when admitting electronic 
information into evidence become very apparent when social media is at 
issue, particularly where the site is hosted outside the U.S.251 
 
[72] Despite social media and networking sites falling under the same 
traditional admissibility rubric as all electronic documents and data, social 
media evidence has occasionally engendered heightened judicial 
skepticism due to concerns about susceptibility of social media and 
networking sites to fraud.252  In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of 
                                                            
248 See Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85212, at *11 
(D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2011) (describing how defendant spoliated evidence, albeit 
unintentionally, in changing his Facebook profile picture while litigation was pending). 
 
249 See Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958, at *280-29 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009).  The court deemed counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
failing to investigate an Internet posting via an AOL Instant Messenger “Buddy” profile 
purporting to be the victim’s recantation of allegations that the Petitioner had molested 
her.  Id. 
 
250  See Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on 
Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366, 369 
(2010). 
 
251 See David J. Goldstone & Daniel B. Reagan, Social Networking, Mobile Devices, and 
the Cloud: The Newest Frontiers of Privacy Law, 55 B.B.J. 17 (2011) (presenting recent 
developments in using social media as evidence). 
 
252 See United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that website 
postings on a white supremacist’s site were ruled unauthenticated where proponent could 
not show that they were posted by the actual group maintaining the site as opposed to the 
proponent herself, who was knowledgeable in the use of computers); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010) (ruling MySpace messages unauthenticated 
because proponent did not offer evidence of others who had access to the page and who 
could have authored the messages); People v. Lenihan, 30 Misc. 3d 289, 911 N.Y.S. 2d 
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Appeals reversed and remanded the matter of the defendant’s conviction 
based on the State’s failure to properly authenticate printouts taken from a 
MySpace profile that contained threatening statements allegedly made by 
the Petitioner’s girlfriend directed towards the State’s witness.253  The 
State attempted to authenticate printouts by using the lead investigator’s 
testimony that he knew it was the Petitioner’s girlfriend’s profile because 
it contained a photograph of her and the Petitioner, her birth date, 
references to the Petitioner, and other details.254  The State never 
questioned the Petitioner’s girlfriend about the subject profile.255  In 
holding that the MySpace printouts were not properly authenticated, the 
Griffin Court highlighted the fact that social networking sites can mask the 
true end-user,256 and that the factors highlighted by the State did not 
constitute sufficient distinctive characteristics257 because of the possibility 
                                                                                                                                                    
588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding that photographs taken from a MySpace profile could 
not be authenticated because they could be edited using certain computer software).   
 
253 Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 347-48 (Md. 2011). 
 
254 Id. at 348.  The MySpace profile also contained the message: “FREE BOOZY!!!! 
JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”  Id.  
“Boozy” was the alleged nickname of the ddefendant and the following comment was 
argued to be consisted with threats the Petitioner’s girlfriend allegedly made to a witness.  
Id. 
 
255 Id. 
 
256 Id. at 353-54 (citing Samantha A. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding 
to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542–43 (2009)) 
(highlighting Sophos, a Boston-based Internet security company, that created a profile for 
a toy frog named “Freddie Staur,” and nearly 200 Facebook users chose to add the frog as 
a friend”);  Id. at 354 (citing United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (D.C.D. Cal 2009)) 
(discussing the case in which a girl committed suicide after being harassed by Lori Drew, 
the mother of a former friend of her daughter’s, using a fictitious MySpace profile).    
 
257 Id. at 357-58.  The ability of a proponent of evidence to support authentication using 
“distinctive characteristics” under Maryland Rule 5-901 mirrors that of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence 901(b)(4).  Id. at 355-56. 
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for fraud.258  The Griffin court went on to suggest methods which counsel 
could use to properly authenticate printouts from social media sites, 
including: 
 
(1) gathering deposition testimony from the alleged owner of the 
subject profile about whether they created the profile and 
posted the content at issue,  
(2) investigating any subject hardware to uncover any evidentiary 
link between such devices and the profile and/or any online 
content, and  
(3) contact service providers directly to gather user-account and 
profile information.259    
 
[73] The Appellate Court of Connecticut further echoed the Griffin 
Court’s concerns regarding the potential for fraud in the world of social 
media in State v. Eleck.260  The Petitioner in Eleck argued that the trial 
court’s refusal to admit a message, allegedly sent by a prosecution witness 
that he printed from his Facebook account, was an abuse of discretion.261  
Defense counsel attempted to use the Facebook message to contradict 
testimony from a State’s witness that she did not communicate with the 
Petitioner following a stabbing.262  In response to the State’s objection to 
                                                            
258 Id. at 352 (citing Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave 
New World of Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.16 (2010)) 
(highlighting that the “identity of who generated the profile may be confound[ed], 
because ‘a person observing the online profile of a user with whom the observer is 
unacquainted has no idea whether the profile is legitimate’”).  But see id. at 367 (Harrell, 
J., dissenting) (“The technological heebie-jeebies discussed in the Majority Opinion go, 
in my opinion, however, not to the admissibility of the print-outs under Rule 5-901, but 
rather to the weight to be given the evidence by the trier of fact.”).       
 
259 See Griffin, 419 Md. at 363-64. 
 
260 State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
 
261 Id. at 820. 
 
262 Id. 
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the Facebook printout, the defense attempted to authenticate the document 
through testimony from the Petitioner: (1) that he printed the message 
from his personal computer; (2) that he recognized the witness’ profile 
name; (3) that the profile contained photographs identifying the witness as 
the profile owner; (4) and that the witness had deleted the Petitioner as a 
friend the day after her testimony in court.263  The witness admitted that 
the messages came from her account but denied authorship and testified 
that her account had been “hacked.”264  Although the court gave the 
hacking claims little weight, the court stated that such testimony highlights 
the security concerns with social media and supported the notion that, 
although the messages came from the witness’ Facebook account, this did 
not conclude that the messages came from the witness herself.265  The 
Court upheld the conviction, in part, on the grounds that the Facebook 
printout had not been properly authenticated.266     
 
[74]  Despite the anonymity offered by social networking sites that may 
support concerns about fraud, some courts have held that the ease of 
altering electronic communications should not be the sole basis for their 
exclusion as unauthenticated.267  Social media presents many of the same 
                                                            
263 Id. at 820-21. 
 
264 Id. at 820. 
 
265 Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822. (citing Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass. 2010)). 
 
266 Id. at 825.  The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the Facebook 
messages could be authenticated using the “reply letter” doctrine, which states that “letter 
B is authenticated merely by reference to its content and circumstances suggesting it was 
in reply to earlier letter A and sent by addressee of letter A . . . .”  CONN. CODE EVID. § 9-
1 (a), commentary (4).  The Eleck court held that there were no circumstances which tied 
the reply message to the alleged sender and the fact that a message was sent and a reply 
received does not, by itself, authenticate the reply.   Eleck, 23 A.3d at 825. 
 
267 See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006); Simon v. State, 
632 S.E.2d 723, 726 (Ga. 2006); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 381 (Mass. 
2011); Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172-73 (Mass. 2010).  
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challenges as paper records.  In the same manner that a profile on 
Facebook may allow a user to hijack another’s identity, “[a] signature can 
be forged, a letter can be typed on another’s typewriter; distinct letter head 
stationary can be copied or stolen.”268  In determining how to verify an 
author’s identity, practitioners need look no further than the current 
rules.269   
 
[75] Though both Griffin and Eleck highlighted the potential for fraud 
in their rulings, deeming certain social media evidence inadmissible, the 
important lesson learned from these opinions is that a proponent of foreign 
social media evidence should potentially offer more than just a profile 
name, photograph, and a few statements about a party to lay a proper 
foundation.  The Eleck court noted that practitioners attempting to 
authenticate social media evidence can do so using traditional methods 
such as obtaining “direct testimony of the purported author or 
circumstantial evidence of ‘distinctive characteristics’ in the document 
that identify the author.”270  In these situations, a party must turn to other 
foundational support.  As can be extrapolated from Griffin, counsel could 
build such support through obtaining hardware or devices where posts 
may have originated for evidence to support distinctive characteristics, 
collecting affidavits from service providers describing any unique 
functionality of a social media site that may provide some indicia of 
                                                            
268 Eleck, 23 A.3d at 823 (citing In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).   
 
269 Id.; see also JOHN BROWNING, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA’S IMPACT ON THE LAW (Aspatore 2010) at 111 
(highlighting the reluctance that courts have shown in crafting rules specifically 
applicable to the authentication of electronic data).  
  
270 Eleck, 23 A.3d at 823.  Examples of distinctive characteristics and corroborating 
circumstances that support authentication include a message sent from a known sender’s 
e-mail address including factual details known to the sender corroborated by a phone call, 
an author of chat room messages showing up at an arranged meeting, instant messages 
authenticated by author’s reference to his own name, surrounding circumstances, and 
threats corroborated by later actions.  Id. at 824-25.   
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authenticity, or gathering testimony from other witnesses who may have 
personal knowledge of a target profile.271 
 
[76] When counsel cannot obtain direct testimony, the process of 
authentication becomes a very fact based inquiry with the proponent 
gathering evidence of “distinctive characteristics” for the court to evaluate 
considering “all the circumstances.”272  When relying on circumstantial 
evidence to authenticate social media evidence, counsel must do her due 
diligence to investigate the media and hardware involved, the applications 
used to generate content and the indicia of reliability in the content itself.  
At least one U.S. Magistrate Judge, with regard to downloaded documents 
generally, stated he “would expect the proponent of downloaded 
document[s] to provide, at a minimum, the web address and path where 
the document was located, the date and title of the document, the date the 
document was accessed/downloaded, and a sworn statement that the 
content of the copy submitted to the court was not altered from the content 
appearing on the website.”273  The circumstances surrounding the creation 
and/or delivery of a piece of social media evidence can go a long way 
towards meeting the authentication burden.  Additional circumstantial 
evidence to support authorship could include (i) expert testimony 
regarding the security controls of a particular website274 as well as the 
                                                            
271 Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 364-65 (Md. 2011). 
 
272 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
 
273 State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 2003 Ohio 6560, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 9, 2003).  Magistrate Judge Lazarus went on to note that “although the legal 
requirements for admissibility of downloaded documents may not be well established, a 
party's statement that ‘I downloaded these pages from the internet’ is probably not 
sufficient to authenticate a downloaded document.”  Id.; see BROWNING, supra note 269 
at 113 (suggesting that evidence showing that a purported web page author actually wrote 
the content could take the form of “…an admission by the author, a stipulation entered 
into by the parties, the testimony of a witness who assisted in or observed the creation of 
the web page, or content on the web page itself that connects it to the author.”).    
 
274 Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172-73 (Mass. 2010). 
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relative ease or difficulty with which the site could be hacked (particularly 
critical in the case of non-U.S. or non-E.U. social media, where security 
controls may be lax),275 (ii) content of the message itself or any 
attachments (i.e. photographs of the purported author, descriptions of 
unique circumstances known only to the sender and the recipient such as 
nicknames or shared experiences, indications that the message or post 
shows an awareness of certain facts in issue),276 and (iii) similar 
                                                            
275 Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 381-82 (Mass. 2011).  The court found 
adequate “confirming circumstances” to authenticate e-mails of a defendant where the e-
mails originated from an account bearing the defendant's name which the defendant 
acknowledged he used, and the e-mails were found on the hard drive of the computer that 
the defendant acknowledged he owned, and to which he supplied all necessary 
passwords.  Id.  The court went on to say that this was sufficient evidence to authenticate 
the e-mails absent persuasive evidence of fraud, tampering, or "hacking."  Id.  Although 
the court further held that “the defendant's uncorroborated testimony that others used his 
computer regularly and that he did not author the e-mails was relevant to the weight, not 
the admissibility, of these messages” it nevertheless behooves counsel objecting to the 
admissibility of certain electronic evidence by arguing fraudulent authorship to present 
expert testimony on the ability to hack a particular website as well as other circumstances 
that may support fraud.  Id.; see People v. Pierre, 41 A.D.3d 289, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007) (in holding that an instant message was properly authenticated through 
circumstantial evidence the court noted that “there was no evidence that anyone had a 
motive, or opportunity, to impersonate defendant using his screen name.”).  The court in 
Purdy went on to find that the defendant's uncorroborated testimony that others used his 
computer regularly and that he did not author the e-mails was relevant to the weight, not 
the admissibility, of these messages.  Purdy at 382. (citing to Com. v. Mahoney, 510 
N.E.2d 759, 762 (Mass. 1987); Chartrand v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 187 N.E.2d 
135, 137 (Mass. 1963).);  The court goes on to state, “Evidence of authorship would not 
necessarily have been a precondition of admissibility if the prosecution had offered the e-
mails, which the defendant acknowledged having read, as evidence of the defendant's 
knowledge of the nature of the massage business in the salon.  If offered for this purpose, 
the prosecution would not need to show authorship of the e-mails, but would need only to 
authenticate the communications as accurate reproductions of the messages that were 
received and sent from the defendant's computer and e-mail address.”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 
276 In Tienda v. State, 05-09-00553-CR, 2010 WL 5129722 (Tex. App. Dec. 17, 2010), 
petition for discretionary review granted (May 4, 2011), aff'd, PD-0312-11, 2012 WL 
385381 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2012).  The Texas Court of Appeals, Fifth District, 
upheld a murder conviction after finding that the trial court did not err in admitting 
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characteristics between unauthenticated messages or online content and 
those definitively authored by the party in question.277  
 
[77] Counsel can help establish the reliability of certain online 
communications and content by giving “due attention to the nature of the 
site at the time relevant to the case.”278  This is particularly germane to 
                                                                                                                                                    
certain evidence taken from MySpace.  The appellant argued that there was no proof that 
the MySpace pages were owned and maintained by him.  However, at trial the court 
introduced evidence that the profile owner identified himself as “Smiley” or “Ron 
Tienda” from “Dallas” or “D-town” as well as photos of the appellant, references to the 
murder of the complainant, and comments mentioning the arrest of the appellant, his 
electronic monitoring device, the fact that multiple parties were involved in the shooting, 
and individuals that gave statements to the police the night of the murder.  The Tienda 
court noted that “the inherent nature of social networking websites encourages members 
who choose to use pseudonyms to identify themselves by posting profile pictures or 
descriptions of their physical appearances, personal backgrounds, and lifestyle.  This type 
of individualization is significant in authenticating a particular profile page as having 
been created by the person depicted in it.” 
 
277 United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that subject 
e-mails can be authenticated through comparison to other e-mails that have been 
authenticated). 
 
278 State v. Altajir, 33 A.3d 193, 197 (Conn. 2012).  In this matter, the defendant received 
a partially suspended prison sentence and probation following her plea of nolo 
contendere after she caused the death of an individual during an auto-accident.  She 
appealed the Connecticut Appellate Court’s affirmation of the trial court’s decision to 
revoke her probation, arguing that her right to due process was violated when the court 
admitted undated Facebook photos which influenced the sentencing decision.  In its 
affirmation of the Appellate Court’s decision, the court stated in a footnote that “due to 
the dynamic nature of Facebook and other such social network sites, these details, as well 
as basic structural features of the social network, are subject to frequent modification. 
Care should therefore be taken to assess information relating to social network sites on a 
case-by-case basis, with due attention to the nature of the site at the time relevant to the 
case.”  In its discussion about where twenty-four of the thirty-six images were located on 
Facebook (i.e. “posted by other Facebook users to their own profiles”), the Court 
discussed certain functionality that Facebook allowed at the time of sentencing (i.e. users 
could “untag” photographs to disassociate them from their personal profile, but a user 
could not delete images from another profile, the user of which had originally posted the 
subject photo).  It is important to note that the Court stated, “the evidence of reliability 
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non-U.S. social media sites that may provide different features, layouts, 
and have developed differently over time.  For example, Renren provides 
an instant messaging service (iRénrénzhuōmiàn or 人人桌面) allegedly 
more popular than that of Facebook, which U.S. counsel should take into 
account when collecting evidence to support authentication of Renren 
pages.279  The fact that Renren was apparently hacked on April 29, 2011 
illustrates how the history of a social media site could impact admitting or 
objecting to evidence.280  Counsel could use this knowledge to challenge 
the authentication of affected profiles on that date or afterwards.  The 
German site StudiVZ offers users the ability to track who most recently 
visited their profile, a feature that many attorneys familiar with Facebook 
may not consider.281  Knowledge of such functionality, as well as 
language and cultural differences (i.e., social media and non-U.S. text 
slang) could help counsel uncover additional distinctive characteristics or 
                                                                                                                                                    
proffered by the state here is, at best, limited, and certainly would not be sufficient under 
the rules of evidence at a trial” when, in submitting that the pictures in question were of 
the defendant while she was on probation, the State represented that the defendant’s hair 
was darker after she was released from prison, consistent with the Facebook photos, and 
offered proof of the upload dates of the photos, all of which went unchallenged by the 
defendant.  See also A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. 2008).  In a juvenile 
delinquency adjudication proceeding, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in reversing the 
judgment of the trial court, noted in dicta that “the evidence presented at the fact-finding 
hearing was extremely sparse, uncertain, and equivocal regarding the operation and use 
of My Space.com (“MySpace”), which is central to this case.”  Id.  The Court provided 
information regarding the “use and operation of MySpace” to “facilitate understanding of 
the facts and application of relevant legal principles.  Id. 
 
279 Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Xiaonei/106216539417805 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2012). (Ironically posted using a Facebook page).   
 
280 Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renren#Privacy_Leakage_ 
April_2011.  Subsequent to the attack, all Chinese media coverage of the event were 
removed.  Screenshots of some of the sources survive, with text in the original Chinese.  
See http://pastebin.com/qKrbvGFF; http://page.renren.com/699131345/note/724338594; 
http://i.imgur.com/NCUi5.png; http://i.imgur.com/4r3FN.png. 
 
281 Facebook does not offer this functionality. 
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circumstances necessary to authenticate evidence collected from a foreign 
social media or networking site.282   
 
E.  Internet Tracking Information 
 
[78] One of the unique benefits that law enforcement and legal 
practitioners have in the Information Age is the ability to track online 
activity through browser caches283 and “cookies.”284  Internet browsing 
history has played a significant role in a number of recent cases.285  
                                                            
282 For example, certain sites are not available in English (i.e. RenRen & Qzone); thus, 
their review will require the use of an experienced translator. 
 
283 “Caching” is a generic term meaning “to store.”  In the context of online activity, 
“caching” refers to the temporary storage of information for later use.  Browser caches 
are locations where data about websites that a user has previously visited is stored.  
Instead of a request being serviced by an online web server, information is retrieved from 
the browser cache allowing for information to be retrieved more quickly.  See Nat'l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 999-1000 (2005) 
(“Cacheing [sic] obviates the need for the end user to download new information from 
third-party Web sites each time the consumer attempts to access them, thereby increasing 
the speed of information retrieval.”).  A browser cache is also commonly referred to as 
the “Temporary Internet Files Folder.”    
 
284 “Cookies” are messages given to web browsers by web servers that are stored locally 
in a text file format.  Cookies are used to track users’ browsing activity.  See Blumofe v. 
Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. Mass. 
2003) (citing M. Enzer, Glossary of Internet Terms, MATISEE.NET, 
http://www.matisse.net/files/glossary (last visited Feb, 4, 2012)). 
 
285 In the quadruple-murder trial of a Montreal couple and their eldest son (dubbed by 
many in the press as the “Shafia Family Murder”), a police officer testified on October 
27, 2011 that searches for “documentaries on murders” and “where to commit a murder” 
were found on the laptop used by one of the defendants.  Timeline: the Shafia family 
murder trial, GLOBAL NEWS AND THE GAZETTE (Feb. 9, 2012, 8:23 AM), 
http://www.globalnews.ca/timeline+shafia+murder+trial/6442509727/story.html.  
Similarly, in the Casey Anthony murder trial, which caused a media frenzy in the U.S. in 
2011, the prosecution offered testimony from technical experts regarding the internet 
browsing history of the defendant including online searches using terms such as 
“chloroform,” “neck breaking,” “inhalation,” “head injury” and “making weapons out of 
household products.”  Jones, Keith J., Casey Anthony Murder Trial, The Computer 
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Although browser caches and cookies are technologically distinct, from an 
evidentiary standpoint, they provide many of the same benefits and pose 
similar challenges.  While there is some support for the notion that certain 
categories of data, including temporary Internet files, search history, 
caches files, and cookies are “generally not discoverable in most cases,”286 
it is important to note that the duty to preserve such data may still apply 
under certain circumstances,287 especially where the proponent of such 
information can show “good cause.”288  Such evidence can also be 
                                                                                                                                                    
Evidence Part #2, JDA BLOG (June 14, 2011, 12:00), 
http://www.jonesdykstra.com/blog/201-caseyanthony-part2. 
 
286 SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM 14 (Oct. 1, 2009).  (“The following categories of ESI 
generally are not discoverable in most cases, and if any party intends to request the 
preservation or production of these categories, then that intention should be discussed at 
the meet and confer or as soon thereafter as practicable… (2) random access memory 
(RAM) or other ephemeral data; (3) on-line access data such as temporary internet files, 
history, cache, cookies, etc.”). 
 
287 Victory Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 524 (D. Md. 2010) 
(holding that “[t]he general duty to preserve may also include deleted data, data in slack 
spaces, backup tapes, legacy systems, and metadata.”) (quoting Paul W. Grimm et. al., 
Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 381, 410 (2008)); see Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, No. 2:06-cv-01093 
FMC-JCx, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96360, at *20-21 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007).  In a 
copyright infringement case filed by several motion pictures studios against the operators 
of a website with servers located in the Netherlands, the court found that data stored in 
defendants’ website’s random access memory (RAM) was extremely relevant and 
ordered that it be preserved.  Id. 
288 Tener v. Cremer, 89 A.D.3d 75, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).  In this defamation action, 
the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department reversed an order 
of the New York Supreme Court denying appellant’s civil contempt motion against a 
non-party for failing to turn over the identities of all persons who accessed the internet at 
a specific time based on the grounds of technological impracticality.  Id.  The court held 
that the appellant had shown “good cause” for requesting the cache file potentially 
present in unallocated space on the target hard drive since the “only chance to confirm 
the identity of the person who allegedly defamed her may lie with [the non-party in 
possession of the data].”  Id.  The court remanded the matter to the trial court for a 
hearing to determine whether the data is in fact “inaccessible.”  Id.  
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discoverable by providing foundational support for other admissible 
evidence (i.e., internet cookies may be used to show a nexus between a 
user and a specific social media site).  As with social media evidence, 
there is a concern that such Internet tracking information can be hacked, 
manipulated, or, absent additional information, serve as a dubious 
indicator of the identity of the actual user.289  This “modification” 
argument, although a very common one, usually does not, absent more 
specific allegations, provide a basis upon which a court will deem cookies 
and other such data inadmissible.290  In affirming the conviction of a 
defendant on various sexual abuse crimes, the Court of Appeals in Utah 
held that a list of Internet cookies that contained site names suggesting 
pornographic content was properly authenticated where the party who 
created the list gave testimony about the operation and regular use of her 
computer, demonstrated a sophisticated knowledge of the interaction 
between her computer and the Internet, and testified that the defendant 
                                                            
289 See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006).  The court 
noted that the possibility of alteration is not limited to e-mail and:  
 
can be true of any piece of documentary evidence, such as a letter, a 
contract or an invoice. . . . The possibility of alteration does not and 
cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as unidentified or 
unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be the 
rationale for excluding paper documents . . . . The defendant is free to 
raise this issue with the jury and put on evidence that e-mails are 
capable of being altered before they are passed on. 
 
Id.; see also United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming 
admission of computer records where allegation of tampering was “…almost wild-
eyed speculation . . . [without] evidence to support such a scenario.”); United States v. 
Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The existence of an air-tight security 
system [to prevent tampering] is not, however, a prerequisite to the admissibility of 
computer printouts.  If such a prerequisite did exist, it would become virtually 
impossible to admit computer-generated records.”). 
 
290 Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
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would have had access to her computer, that she personally viewed many 
of the subject sites, and that she created the list of cookies herself.291  
 
[79] The proponent of such evidence collected from foreign sources 
faces the same dilemma as with social media or other ESI evidence 
collected domestically and can take further guidance from Griffin:  
 
(1) Is there a credible source of testimony to authenticate such 
evidence from the host country?  
(2) Can one acquire the devices in question to further investigate 
such Internet tracking information?  
(3) Can one gather the information necessary to authenticate such 
browsing history and other such data (i.e. subpoenaing Google 
to obtain the IP addresses and user names to ultimately link 
certain online activity to certain people or devices or 
subpoenaing Internet Service Providers to link IP address to 
specific ISP customers, where such subpoenas are permissible 
pursuant to applicable law)?292   
(4) What do Internet browsing history and other cookie data 
actually prove?293   
 
[80] Just as the Griffin and Eleck courts highlighted the fact that 
although a social media printout or display will readily show only that 
someone posted a particular piece of content and not necessarily who 
posted it, internet tracking information will show only that someone 
visited a site, but the who can only be uncovered through the same type of 
                                                            
291 State v. Burke 256 P.3d 1102, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
 
292 In a defamation lawsuit filed in California, counsel for a Turkish developer 
subpoenaed Google for user information and IP address log-in history.  Kinay v. TCI 
Journal, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW JOURNAL (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.citmedialan 
w.org/threats/kinay-v-tci-journal (case pending in California state court).  
 
293 See supra note 284.  
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analysis of distinctive characteristics and corroborating circumstances as 
other ESI.294 
 
F.  An International Case Study 
 
[81] Where testimony from foreign sources is unavailable, distinctive 
characteristics and other corroborating circumstantial evidence must 
authenticate foreign ESI.  The following case study illuminates these 
issues.  In a 2009 criminal conspiracy case, United States v. Albert 
Gonzalez, three men were indicted on various charges involving the online 
theft of credit card numbers.295  The government submitted two pieces of 
evidence: a computer server where the defendant allegedly stored hacking 
programs and stolen credit card numbers and files from a laptop seized 
during the arrest of a co-defendant.296  The evidence was collected with 
the help of the state police of Latvia and Turkey.297  The government 
submitted Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty requests for the foreign 
nationals who assisted in the acquisition of the evidence to provide 
testimony but uncertainty existed over the ability to secure such 
evidence.298  Regardless, the government submitted that such testimony 
                                                            
294 See generally Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791 (Md. 2010), cert. granted, 415 Md. 607 
(Md. 2010), rev'd, 419 Md. 343 (Md. 2011). 
 
295 Government’s Motion in limine at 2, United States v. Albert Gonzalez, Crim. Docket 
No. 2:08-cr-00160-SJF-AKT, Aug. 17, 2009, ECF No. 61-1, available at 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/08/maksik_computer_motion.pdf. 
 
296 Id. (The Government generated forensic images for the both the Latvian server and the 
seized laptop for evidentiary purposes.). 
 
297  Id. at 3-7; see also Kim Zetter, In Gonzalez Hacking Case, a High-Stakes Fight Over 
a Ukranian’s Laptop, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatl 
evel/2009/08/gonzalez-evidence/. 
 
298 See Government’s Motion in limine at 4-7, Gonzalez, Crim. Docket No. 2:08-cr-
00160-SJF-AKT, Aug. 17, 2009, ECF No. 61-1, available at http://www.wired.com 
/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/08/maksik_computer_motion.pdf.  The government 
expressed this concern in a footnote to its letter brief: “The government . . . has no power 
to compel foreign citizens to testify in United States court proceedings.  It is uncertain at 
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was not required since a foundation could be properly laid through 
circumstantial evidence.299 
 
[82] In arguing that the “distinctive characteristics” of the server, in 
combination with various circumstances, provided sufficient evidence for 
its authentication, the Government submitted that (i) the computer server 
and the forensic image taken of the server were “substantially 
identical,”300 (ii) the IP address provided by a cooperating witness was 
hosted on the target server, (iii) none of the subject files were altered on 
the server following the arrest of the cooperating witness and the 
defendant, and (iv) the examiners were able to open files on the server 
using the password provided by the cooperating witness.301  
 
[83] The Government also submitted a forensic image of the files of the 
laptop seized prior to the co-defendant’s arrest.302  The image emerged 
after the co-defendant was in custody, and, furthermore,  counsel showed 
that: (i) no files were altered between the date of arrest and the date of 
image creation, (ii) the image displayed the same “Mars” logon screen, 
which was photographed on the date of arrest, (iii) the image contained 
                                                                                                                                                    
this time whether these individuals will agree to travel to the United States for trial in this 
case, or even to be deposed here or in their home nations.”  Id. at 1-2, n.1. 
 
299 Id. at 9-11. 
 
300 Id. at 4.  During an arrest of an accomplice of the ddefendant, Unites States Secret 
Service tracked an IP address used to mask criminal activities to a server in Riga, Latvia.  
The government originally acquired a forensic image of the server, but then obtained 
possession of the server itself to compare to the image.  The comparison evidenced that 
the server had not been altered after the defendant had been arrested.  All of the files on 
the server the government intended to use at trial were identical.  The only difference was 
that the image contained some text strings consistent with a signature or metadata created 
by the device manufacturer or disk controller.  Id.  
 
301 Id. at 5. 
 
302 Id. at 4. 
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chat logs identical to those found on the defendants’ computer (seized 
several months later) as well as chat logs identical to those sent from an 
undercover agent’s computer to co-defendant, and (iv) the image had 
several factors in common with an image made of the same laptop during 
a prior search including identical chat logs, logon screen, and file 
containers with the same password.303 
 
[84] Although many circumstances make a criminal matter like 
Gonzales an extreme example of authentication through distinctive 
characteristics, the case provides counsel with some comfort that 
circumstantial evidence can authenticate foreign ESI even if foreign 
witnesses are absent or uncooperative.  In Gonzalez, the government relied 
heavily on evidence collected through forensic imaging and analysis of 
various devices.304  Although counsel in civil cases may not have the 
benefit of such devices as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the 
European Union Privacy Directives, member state implementing laws, or 
national blocking statutes may prevent counsel from acquiring certain 
information, this case highlights the technological means by which foreign 
ESI can be collected, investigated, and distinguished for authentication 
purposes.305 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[85] The expenditure of thousands of person-hours and, often, hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, to collect evidence from around the globe can be a 
very costly Sisyphean effort, if counsel does not have the knowledge and 
skills to present the evidence before the finder of fact.  The Rules of 
Evidence apply to electronic information with the same force as they do to 
                                                            
303 Government’s Motion in limine at 6-7, Gonzalez, Crim. Docket No. 2:08-cr-00160-
SJF-AKT, Aug. 17, 2009, ECF No. 61-1, available at http://www.wired.com/images_blo 
gs/threatlevel/2009/08/maksik_computer_motion.pdf. 
 
304 See generally id. 
 
305 See generally id.  
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paper documents.306  The differences are in the application of those rules 
to electronic evidence, which many lawyers and judges find to be 
somewhat daunting.307  This problem does not have to exist, though.  To 
paraphrase Paul Simon, taking the admissibility of non-electronic 
evidence logically by anticipating the need for fulfillment of the requisites 
of the foundation for such evidence, and having documents and witnesses 
ready to lay the foundation for the evidence or to challenge it,will produce 
a result that can justify all the time and money spent in obtaining the 
evidence.308 
                                                            
306 See FED. R. EVID. 403; FED R. EVID 901.  See generally supra Section V. 
 
307 See supra Section V. 
 
308 See SIMON, supra note 35. 
